Japan's Official Development Assistance : Case Philippines and Human Security by Ranta, Mika
 Name: Ranta Mika Topias 
Date: 8.5.2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRO GRADU THESIS 
JAPAN’S OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE:  
CASE PHILIPPINES AND HUMAN SECURITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Centre for East Asian Studies 
Faculty of Social Sciences 
University of Turku 
2/86 
 
The originality of this thesis has been checked in accordance with the University of 
Turku quality assurance system using the Turnitin Originality Check Service. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3/86 
UNIVERSITY OF TURKU 
Centre for East Asian Studies/Faculty of Social Sciences 
RANTA, MIKA: Japan‟s Official Development Assistance 
Pro Gradu Thesis, 86p. 
East Asian Studies 
May 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4/86 
 
Abstract 
 
Through the initial exploration of the history of Japan‟s Official Development 
Assistance program, this thesis has identified its distinct phases, influential actors, 
norms, ideology and the philosophy behind it. Ever since the release of the original 
Official Development Assistance Charter in 1992 and its subsequent revisions in 2003 
and 2015, the program has gone through seemingly fundamental changes, the most 
radical being, the adoption of human security as its guiding principle. Consequently, the 
main research objective of this thesis is to initially, compare the values, basic policies 
and goals of the 2015 Charter to the implementation of Japan‟s Official Development 
Assistance program in the Philippines and to evaluate the degree of their alignment. 
Secondly, the thesis has assessed what are the concrete manifestations of human 
security in Japan-Philippines development cooperation. Due to the extensive history and 
wide manifestations of Japan‟s development cooperation with the Philippines, 
encompassing peacebuilding, infrastructure improvement and securitization among 
other fields, the country provides an excellent focus of analysis. The research objectives 
of this thesis have been achieved through the utilization of policy and frame analysis 
concurrently. Subsequently, the analysis revealed alignments and misalignment between 
the policy projections in the Charter and the implementation of Japan‟s Official 
Development Assistance in the Philippines, as well as, unexpected observations 
regarding the manifestations of human security. Most prominently, the research 
discovered a conflict between the pacifism in the Charter and the de facto security and 
defense cooperation through Japan‟s Official Development Assistance framework to the 
Philippines. In addition, the thesis came to the conclusion that, Japan‟s peacebuilding 
efforts in the conflict of Mindanao have been more aligned with proactive pacifism, 
rather than human security, due to the lack of grassroots level individual security 
approach. Moreover, the research has identified scaling issues in regards to the policy 
projection and goals in the Charter, which may explain the continuing lack of a judicial 
basis for the Charter. Consequently, the author suggests that the true purpose for the 
Charter is to act as a statement of purpose for the international donor community, 
instead of being a comprehensive foundational policy document.   
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1. Introduction 
 
This thesis will discuss and analyze Japan‟s Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
program, vis-à-vis, one of the major recipient nations in Asia, the Philippines. It will 
also reflect upon this donor-recipient relationship with the bilateral relations in general, 
while paying special attention to recent developments in the relations, since the 
inauguration of President Rodrigo Duterte in 2016. As a developing nation with a 
growing economy and a youthful and energetic labor force, the Philippines has 
consistently been a major recipient of Japan‟s ODA for more than half a century. In 
addition, there are significant trade flows between the nations and in 2006, the Japan-
Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA), was signed bilaterally (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Japan [MOFA] 2006). Furthermore, between the two nations, 
there are significant amounts of technology transfer, volunteering, labor movement and 
most importantly, material and immaterial resources towards the improvement of 
Philippine infrastructure and social welfare, sent and implemented by the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA).  
The JICA plays a key role in the actual implementation of Japan‟s ODA 
program in all the recipient countries. It is the largest bilateral ODA agency in the 
world, operating in 150 different states and regions around the globe. In 2017, a total of 
$19.57 billion of ODA funds was funneled through the organization (JICA 2019). In 
recent decades, several high profile infrastructure projects in the Philippines have been 
funded and implemented by the JICA. These projects have eased travel congestion, 
boosted economic development and growth, as well as improved the highway, flooding 
prevention, disaster preparedness and air travel infrastructure on the Philippine islands. 
In the near future, even more ambitious development cooperation can be expected since, 
the JICA and the Government of the Philippines have approved the construction of an 
entire subway system in the capital region, Metro Manila (Gatpolintan 2017).    
The Japanese ODA model and philosophy, has often been challenged by western 
donor countries in the international arena, as Japan is a member of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development‟s (OECD) Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC). This sub-organization of the OECD is essentially an inclusive 
international forum for the largest donor countries and multilateral organizations. Japan 
was the first Asian country to join the DAC in 1961, which it joined, even before 
officially becoming a member of the mother organization, the OECD itself (Jain 2016, 
pp. 94-95). As a general rule concerning at least the ODA programs of all the DAC 
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member countries, ODA essentially consists of: grants, technical assistance, loans and 
multilateral assistance (handled and distributed by: Asian Development Bank [ADB], 
World Bank [WB], United Nations [UN] and so on) (Kawai & Takagi 2004, p. 264).  
The primary research objective of this thesis is to examine, the degree of 
alignment of Japan‟s ODA to the Philippines, with the stated goals and basic policies of 
the latest revision of the program‟s foundational document; the Official Development 
Assistance Charter (hereafter ODA Charter). In other words, the thesis will engage in 
policy assessment of Japan‟s ODA to the Philippines. The initial research question of 
the thesis is the following: “How well does Japan‟s contemporary ODA to the 
Philippines align with the values, goals and basic policies of the 2015 revision of the 
Official Development Assistance Charter?” In the Charter‟s most recent revision of 
2015 (renamed “Development Cooperation Charter”), the promotion of human security 
and contribution to peace and prosperity have been included in its basic policy 
objectives (MOFA 2015, p. 4). In addition, human security is described as being the 
founding principle of Japan‟s contemporary ODA (ibid.). Consequently, the second 
research question for this thesis is the following: “What are the concrete manifestations 
of human security in Japan‟s ODA policy implementations in the Philippines?”  
The primary sources of the thesis are the newest ODA Charter, other documents, 
publications and statistics released by the MOFA and the JICA, in addition to, those 
released by the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) of the Philippines. 
In regards to secondary and tertiary sources, the author shall use relevant books, 
scholarly articles from academic journals, and news articles and other web based 
sources, which are relevant to the topic, research objectives and the context.     
The progressive concept of human security was introduced to Japan‟s foreign 
policy in the late 1990s and subsequently, to its ODA policy, via ODA Charter revision 
in 2003. The concept has maintained its prominent place in the 2015 revision as well.  
The UN General Assembly has defined the concept as: ―The right of people to live in 
freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair‖ (Kitaoka 2016, pp. 32, 34, 35). As 
a consequence of this breakthrough of human security into the foreign and development 
cooperation policy of Japan, it is vital to assess, how much of its ideals can be observed 
in the implementation of ODA in the Philippines. As a developing nation suffering from 
severe poverty, lack of infrastructure, armed conflicts and terrorism, it is prime 
candidate for such analysis.     
Due to Japan‟s active role in peacebuilding in the armed conflict of Mindanao 
among other humanitarian efforts in the Philippines, this particular development 
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assistance relation provides an adequate base for a case study. However, as one might 
question the validity of categorizing peacebuilding under the umbrella ODA, according 
to the ODA Charter of 2015: "development" in this Charter is used in a broader sense 
rather than in the narrow sense; it also encompasses such activities as peacebuilding 
and governance, promotion of basic human rights and humanitarian assistance‖ 
(MOFA 2015, p. 1). Consequently, the scope of activities that Japan‟s ODA entails 
differs from the conventional understanding of development assistance.  
After this introduction, this paper will discuss the history of Japan‟s ODA, 
through exploring its inception and development from the 1950s to the 2000s and 
beyond. The “High Growth Years” subsection will discuss the 1970s and 1980s, which 
culminated in Japan becoming the global top donor in 1989. The latter subsections of 
this chapter will discuss and analyze what characteristics make Japan‟s ODA stand out 
in comparison to the ODA of other major donor countries, and to analyze the ideology, 
motives, norms and values behind it. Such analyses of the latter kind have been frequent 
among scholars of international relations and political sciences in general (Miller & 
Dolsak 2007; Sato & Asano 2008; Asplund 2015) and thus, these are important aspects 
to explore.  
The subsequent section of the thesis will firstly, detail the history of Japan-
Philippines relations and the inception of bilateral developmental cooperation, which is 
followed by two brief reports of major recent and future infrastructure projects in the 
Philippine islands. The subsequent chapters of the section will discuss alternative forms 
of Japanese ODA to the Philippines such as; Japan being a peacebuilder on the southern 
island of Mindanao. In addition, it will also discuss the growing role of Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and their role in Japan‟s ODA to the Philippines. 
The following chapter about securitization will discuss arguably the most unorthodox 
field in the contemporary bilateral development cooperation. Before concluding the 
section, a discussion of developments following the election victory of controversial 
populist President Rodrigo Duterte will commence. Chapter 4 will analyze the 
Development Cooperation Charter by identifying the goals, values and basic policies in 
the Charter and then, it will conduct a policy analysis in regards to them and the 
implementation of Japan‟s ODA in the Philippines. Secondly, Chapter 4 will also use 
frame analysis firstly, by identifying and extracting the dominant frames in the policy 
document and then, it will compare the dominant frames to the policy implementation 
as well. 
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2. The History and Development of Japanese ODA 
 
This chapter will outline all the major historical phases in Japan‟s ODA, which have all 
had a role in shaping it into what it is today, from its inception in the 1950s to the 21
st
 
century and beyond. Scholar Hirata (2002, p. 165) has conceptualized the historical 
development of Japan‟s ODA into three distinctive phases, with the first phase of 1950s 
to 1975 titled: “Japanese economy-first policy”. The second phase from 1975 to late 
1980s formulated as: “the beginning of aid diversification and politicization”. Finally, 
the last phase from her book, stretching from the late 1980s to the 2000s is phrased as 
the following: “further diversification and politicization of aid”. Based on subsequent 
developments in the new millennium, especially since the release of the Development 
Cooperation Charter in 2015, there is a clear need for a fourth phase in the trajectory of 
the development of Japan‟s foreign aid policy. The characteristics and title of the fourth 
phase will be reveled at the summary section of this chapter.   
The roots of Japan‟s ODA program date back all the way to the Article 14 of the 
Treaty of San Francisco of 1951, which forced Japan to pay war reparations to the 
Southeast Asian (SEA) countries, that had suffered damages caused by Imperial Japan 
during World War II. The initial reparations were non-monetary transfers, consisting of 
industrial materials and equipment, which were direly needed to rebuild industry and 
infrastructure in these impoverished war-torn nations. Initially, the SEA states 
demanded monetary compensations from Japan however, due to US pressure these 
states eventually dropped their demands and accepted the material reparations. This was 
all due to a US Cold War agenda, in which, the goal was to support the quick economic 
recovery and growth of Japan and to foster a strong ally against the spread of 
Communism in Asia (Mitsuya 2007, pp. 18, 20). 
In the case of the Philippines, the war reparation payments begun in 1956 with 
the transfer of $550 million worth of machinery and equipment along with technical 
assistance to the Philippine government (Pante & Reyes 1991, p. 122). As noted by 
scholar Hirata (2002, p. 166), the reparations did not solely take place as stipulated by 
the San Francisco Peace Treaty, but they also served the purpose of stimulating the 
recovering Japanese industry and the economy as a whole. Consequently, it can be 
concluded that the collective national punishment on Japan‟s wartime aggression was 
conveniently used for the benefit of domestic economic interests as well.  
The reparation transfers lasted until 1976 and although, the majority of the 
transfers consisted of earmarked Japanese machinery and technical equipment, the 
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reparations also contributed to the improvement of basic infrastructure, educational, 
health care and other public facilities (Pante & Reyes 1991, pp. 122-123). Thus, in 
consideration of this background, it is clear to perceive how the roots for the subsequent 
ODA program were established through the war reparations.         
In 1958 the first ODA loans from Japan were handed out to developing countries 
in Asia, which received most of the aid, both then and now. Both loan provisions and 
war reparations saw significant increases in the 1950s and 1960s, with the goal of 
expanding the export market for Japanese products and securing imports of raw 
materials into Japan (Asplund 2017, p. 4). Thus one can conclude that, the rapidly 
growing and developing Japan was able to turn the war reparations into an economic 
stimulus and an export boost for the private sector, as Hirata (2002 p. 166) details:  
 
―Although the total amount of reparations and quasi-reparations was relatively small 
(approximately US$1 billion and US$490 million in total) they benefitted the Japanese 
economy significantly‖. Hirata (ibid.) continues: “the Japanese products under the 
reparations brought about further demands for Japanese goods in the recipient 
countries as local markets became dependent on them‖. 
  
Peculiarly, at the time when Japan started its ODA program in the 1950s, the 
country was also a major recipient of ODA loans itself from the WB. Most notably, 
these loans enabled the construction of the first bullet train line (Tōkaidō Shinkansen) 
from Tokyo to Osaka, as well as that of highway infrastructure around the national 
capital Tokyo. Astoundingly, in 1990 Japan was able to pay fully pay back its debts to 
the WB, while at the same time, it had become a global top ODA donor a year earlier in 
1989 (Orr 1990, p. 1). This collective experience of rebuilding the nation from the ashes 
of devastating war, using loan aid responsibly on the improvement of key infrastructure 
and paying the loans back on time, has clearly impacted the underlying ideology, 
characteristics and development of the Japanese ODA program as a whole. In Chapter 
1.6 of norms, motives and values, this and other factors will be discussed in more detail. 
 
 
2.1 Post World War II Era 
 
In terms of terminology, ODA and foreign aid as terms were not initially present in 
Japan‟s official foreign policy vernacular. Prior to the inclusion of this terminology, the 
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activities that are now categorized under the umbrella of ODA, or of Other Official 
Flows (OOF), were simply labeled as economic cooperation (keizai kyōryoku). This 
cooperation also included private foreign investments (Söderberg 1996, p. 33; Orr 1990, 
p. 53). The term OOF, essentially stands for bilateral transactions that do not meet the 
OECD‟s requirements for an ODA classification. That being said, they can be very 
similar to ODA transfers in nature. As an example, monetary transfers for the purpose 
of promoting development that have a grant element of fewer than 25 %, fall under the 
category of OOF instead of ODA (OECD Data 2018).  
 During these early steps of Japanese development assistance, western observers 
were often confused whether Japan was truly engaged in a development cooperation 
with the developing countries or simply, furthering its own trade and economic agenda. 
Following the cessation of the war reparations, it became increasing clear to be more of 
the latter than the former. Even in Japan‟s official Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry‟s (MITI) white paper released in 1958, aid was essentially tied together with 
the promotion of trade (Orr 1990, pp. 53-54). From a cultural point of view, charity and 
foreign aid have a strong correlation with Christianity and western colonialism which, 
according to Orr (1990 p. 54), explains the difference in Japan‟s foreign aid. Also in 
contemporary ODA of Japan, the principle of self-help is still one of its founding 
principles, which stands in contrast to western aid philosophy that is arguably more 
altruistic in nature. These fundamental differences in aid philosophy will be discussed 
further in chapters 2.5 and 2.6.    
 As previously mentioned, the beginning of the Japanese ODA program had two 
influential enabling factors in the early 1950s: the war reparations and Japan joining the 
Colombo Plan. In 1954, Japan made its first donation of $50,000 to the Colombo Plan, 
which was a multinational organization for the social and economic development in 
Asia and the Pacific (Söderberg 1996, p. 33; MOFA 2014, p. 2). Much like what are 
now known as ODA and OOF transfers, the war reparations were not recognized as 
foreign aid at the time, instead, the reparations were seen as export promotion. The 
recipient countries of war reparations corresponded well with Japan‟s military campaign 
during World War II. However, there were some notable countries that did not receive 
any reparations from Japan, despite being some of the most negatively affected by Japan 
in World War II, namely: China and South/North Korea. This was mainly the case due 
to political alliances and the Cold War dynamics, particularly since the communist 
takeover of mainland China (Söderberg 1996, pp. 33-34). That being said, there were 
neither any claims for reparations from China, as the country was embroiled in intense 
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Maoist fervor in the 1950s, while Japan was already deeply embedded in its alliance 
with the US (Orr 1990, p. 53). Consequently, Taiwan on the other hand, did receive aid 
since the inception of the ODA program till the establishment of diplomatic relations 
with the People‟s Republic of China in 1972 (Söderberg 1996, p. 214).       
 Japan started handing out yen loans through the Japan Export-Import Bank 
(JEXIM) in 1957, of which the majority were granted to India and Pakistan, in addition 
to various SEA nations. Considering the ODA guidelines of the present day, these loans 
would not have been qualified as ODA now, due to their high interest rates. Between 
the years 1957 and 1964 a total of 21 bilateral yen loan agreements were made, of 
which, 16 were signed with India and Pakistan. These loans served a dual purpose of 
aiding the development of impoverished countries, while at the same time, aiding 
Japanese companies to break into the growing markets of Asia. During the 1960s, the 
economy of Japan was gaining momentum and consequently, it became a member of 
the OECD‟s DAC and handed out the first grant aid in 1969. Coincidentally, the 
concept of ODA was introduced during the same year by the DAC (Söderberg 1996, p. 
34).      
 
2.2 The High Growth Years 
 
During the 1960s, the vast majority of Japanese aid was directed towards Asia. 
However, the recipients of Japan‟s ODA became more diverse after 1973, as a 
consequence of the Yom Kippur war in the Middle East and the subsequent oil embargo 
on US allies, imposed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 
Subsequently, an unofficial ratio of 7:1:1:1 was adopted in regards to the geographical 
distribution of Japanese ODA. To be precise, this ratio allocated 70 % of ODA to Asia, 
and 10 % each to the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. This oil crisis highlighted 
Japan‟s reliance on energy imports and politicized its ODA allocations, which 
materialized into generous ODA packages being offered by a Japanese delegation 
visiting the Middle East. The goal of this donation diplomacy in the Middle East was to 
demonstrate Japan‟s neutrality vis-à-vis the US and Israel, while guaranteeing the 
smooth shipments of oil from the Middle East to Japan. This was essentially the start of 
the so called gifting diplomacy (omiyage gaiko), which would later become a salient 
feature of Japan‟s foreign policy especially in Asia (Söderberg 1996, pp. 34-35; Orr 
1990, p. 55).  
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Thanks to the oil crisis of 1973, the utility of ODA as a diplomatic tool in the 
pacifist nation‟s arsenal became acknowledged in the political and bureaucratic circles 
of the Japanese state. Countries rich in energy resources and even those on the shipping 
routes towards Japan became candidates for Japan‟s aid fund allocations (Orr 1990, p. 
55). Consequently, a major theme in the post-1973 oil crisis ODA was to improve the 
economic infrastructure of resource rich developing nations (Asplund 2015, p. 5). As 
infrastructure projects still play a significant role in Japanese foreign aid, it is evident 
that this characteristic of it became increasingly salient following the 1973 oil crisis. 
Furthermore, the oil crisis brought about a new focus in Japanese foreign policy on 
resource security, which was tied to the use of ODA as a strategic foreign policy tool.  
A key concept of this era in Japan‟s general foreign policy was the so called 
Fukuda Doctrine, spearheaded by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda and it was initiated 
during his speech in Manila, Philippines in 1977. Overall, it was a watershed moment in 
the foreign policy of Japan and in its relationship vis-à-vis SEA in particular. The 
Fukuda Doctrine had essentially three main characteristics. Firstly, a key point in it was 
to ensure the ASEAN community and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole of Japan‟s 
peaceful intentions, and of its complete rejection of war and military aggression. Other 
key points were the following; building bilateral trust and confidence between the 
representatives of Japan and the ASEAN member states and having an equal partnership 
between the two. In addition to this new policy declaration, a generous sum of 1 billion 
US$ in ODA funds was to be dispensed around the ASEAN region (Hirata 2002, pp. 
168-169).      
During the late 1970s, a sequence of events paved the way towards Japan 
reaching the global top donor status in 1989. In 1977, the first ODA doubling plan was 
announced by Prime Minister Fukuda, which triggered the first major infighting 
between different government ministries regarding ODA. The announcement to double 
the aid volume was seen as a victory to the MOFA, while the Ministry of Finance was 
against it based on fiscal reasons. In addition, MITI was campaigning against the 
increasing untying of aid, which was a response to international criticism of Japan‟s 
ODA of being too self-serving. Unsurprisingly, MITI perceived this liberation of aid 
funds to be against core Japanese business interests and consequently, campaigned 
against it. Furthermore, there was a clear divide between whether to use ODA as a 
political tool or as an economic one as, MITI was in favor of latter and MOFA of the 
former (Orr 1990, pp. 55-56). Through cumulative budget increases and the rise in the 
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value of Japanese Yen, during the 1970s and 1980s, the value of Japan‟s ODA 
increased tremendously from $500 million to $9 billion (Kawai & Takagi 2004, p. 259).   
In the course of the 1970s and 1980s, as Japan was gaining impressive trade 
surpluses, the economy was still growing strong and the country‟s wealth was on par, if 
not even surpassing that of western developed nations. Consequently, there were 
increasing calls in the international forums for Japan to start taking a larger and a more 
responsible role in international relations. There was a clear understanding in Japan‟s 
political elite that, the increasing burden-sharing would essentially mean increasing 
funding for ODA to which, it was not opposed as, it was becoming an increasingly 
important diplomatic and strategic tool for the pacifist state. The instability of this 
period of history caused by: the second oil crisis of 1979, the withdrawal of US troops 
from Vietnam in 1973 and the debt crisis spreading among the developing nations, were 
great pushing factors for the greater burden-sharing role for Japan (Hirata 2002, pp. 
168-169).         
During the years 1980 to 1989, Japan‟s ODA disbursements nearly tripled in 
size: from 3,304 million US dollars in 1980, to 8,965 million in 1989. However, its 
ODA as a percentage of Gross National Product (GNP) stayed roughly the same at 0,32, 
which has been slightly lower than the DAC average at the time (Yanagihara & Emig 
1991, pp. 42-44). According to Mochizuki (et al. 2007, p. 4), during the 1980s the 
concept of comprehensive security became trendy among major donor countries. This 
concept essentially combined defense, social and economic aspects for the welfare and 
safety of people. Because of the prominence of comprehensive security as an ideal 
internationally, it also had an influence on Japan‟s development cooperation at that 
time. The idea was that, Japan could spread its huge trade surplus to support the 
development of impoverished nations, which would indirectly benefit Japan, by keeping 
the international system stable and secure for trade and other purposes (ibid.). The 
concept of comprehensive security can be seen as a precursor to the concept of human 
security, which Japan‟s ODA and also the foreign policy as a whole has embraced and 
integrated since the early 2000s.      
Over the past decades, China has been a huge recipient of Japanese ODA. 
According to one estimate, up until 2007, a huge majority (91.5 %) of it has been 
received by China alone (Jain 2016, p. 104). Since the 1979 visit to China by the then 
Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira (Söderberg 1996, p. 214), Japan‟s ODA has played an 
enormous role in the development of Chinese infrastructure and consequently, as one 
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can argue, it has also massively contributed to its staggering economic growth in recent 
decades.  
The Japanese aid allocations to China grew vastly during the 1980s. For 
instance, from 1982 to 1986, China stood out as the single largest recipient of Japan‟s 
ODA funds (Söderberg 1996, p. 214). This was also the case in 1988, with the total 
amount of $673.70 million, which made Japan the top donor to China of all its 15 donor 
countries. However, aid disbursements and plans for future projects were temporarily 
halted in 1989, as a response to the infamous Tiananmen Square Massacre in Beijing. 
This action was a clear value based judgement to demonstrate Japan‟s commitment to 
liberal democratic values in line with the western nations. Until the events that unfolded 
in Tiananmen and its aftermath, the vast majority of Japan‟s ODA transfers to the 
People‟s Republic, consisted of concessional loans (Orr 1990, pp. 73-75).    
The reason why China was such a magnet for Japanese ODA funds in the 1980s 
was due to two different factors. Firstly, as a consequence of the sheer size of the 
country and surely, due to the incredible ambition for development that both the public 
and private sector had in China, the list of projects to be eligible for an ODA loan was 
seemingly endless. As a second factor, the Chinese officials always had feasible and 
well thought out projects to propose for Japanese ODA funding in the pipeline, which 
was often not the case with other developing countries and thus, it was convenient for 
the Japanese bureaucrats as well (ibid.).  
For the back then developing (now middle income) country like China, the 
Japanese style of ODA, which requires active participation and planning of the recipient 
country‟s administration (self-help), is very suitable, due to the high human capital and 
skills in the Chinese population. However, such a requirement often excludes the 
neediest and the most impoverished of countries from receiving Japan‟s ODA, which 
has been an internationally contested topic in Japan‟s ODA (see Jain 2016 for instance).  
To conclude, because of the first oil crisis of 1973, the portfolio of Japanese aid 
recipients became more diverse and global. Because of a variety of additional factors 
including: economic growth and trade surpluses, the Fukuda Doctrine and the 
developmental rise of China, Japan rose to the top position in term of ODA 
disbursements in 1989. It also maintained this global top donor status for much of the 
1990s (Fujisaki et al. 1997), despite the end of its high growth economic boom era. The 
huge growth in ODA volume from the 1960s to the end of 1980s, can also be partly 
explained by normative foreign pressure and also, by the realization in Japan‟s political 
elite that, ODA can be used as a geopolitical and strategic tool by the pacifist state.  
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2.3 The 1990s 
 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union, the breakdown of the vast majority of socialist 
countries and the resulting end of the Cold War, caused major changes to the 
international system and consequently, to Japan‟s foreign aid policy as well. The 1990s 
provided a new set of challenges to the international donor community and also new 
recipient nations emerged from the ashes of real socialism. Japan eagerly established 
development support relations with Mongolia and the Central Asian republics of 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan in the early 1990s. 
In addition, Japan resumed its aid to Cambodia and Vietnam after a long hiatus. Overall, 
Japan was increasingly tying its aid with democratization, marketization and with the 
respect of human rights. In relation to these values in 1990, the former Prime Minister 
Toshiki Kaifu, announced Japan‟s support for the democratization of the newly 
independent Eastern European states. These values were made an official part of 
Japan‟s foreign aid policy, through the publication of the first ODA Charter in 1992 
(Hirata 2002, pp. 172-173). This initial Charter was made in response to criticisms, of 
both domestic and foreign in origin, which claimed that Japan‟s ODA program lacked 
any philosophical and/or ideological foundation. Despite the fact that the Charter was 
approved by the Cabinet of Japan, it is not based on any national laws (Jain 2016, p.98). 
 To detail, the ODA Charter of 1992 lists four different principles or themes that 
should be abided by the MOFA and the JICA. These principles were: environmental 
conservation, avoiding the use of ODA for military or malignant purposes, denying 
ODA from countries with high military budgets and weapons of mass destruction 
(WMDs), and the promotion of democratization and market economy. As stated by the 
Charter, the actual implementation of Japan‟s ODA will also be influenced by the 
country‟s bilateral relation with Japan, the socio-economic environment and by the type 
of development assistance request of the recipient nation (Kawai & Takagi 2004, p. 
260).                 
 A new development in regards to Japan‟s foreign aid policy in the early 1990s, 
was the inclusion of international peacekeeping efforts. Peacekeeping was a major 
humanitarian activity coordinated by the UN. Meanwhile, Japan was seeking a greater 
role in the transnational organization, and to become a permanent member in UN‟s 
Security Council. In 1991, in tandem with the resumption of aid to Cambodia, Japan 
also sent peacekeepers to the country under a UN peacekeeping mission. This was the 
first instance since World War II that, Japan sent members of its military, in other 
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words, members of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) abroad (Hirata 2002, pp. 173-
174). One can also see this as a response to past criticisms in which, Japan‟s aid was 
perceived as highly impersonal and lukewarm, merely as financial assistance, in other 
words, as checkbook diplomacy.   
 It was also in Cambodia later during the decade that, Japan ventured into the 
domain of peace building as well. In 1997 Japan successfully acted as a mediator 
between two rival Prime Ministers, which helped to prevent the outbreak of yet another 
civil conflict in Cambodia. This successful experience gave Japan the courage to later 
participate in other peacebuilding projects around SEA, namely: in East Timor and 
Mindanao (Peng Er 2008, p. 47). Details of the latter case will be explored in Chapter 
3.3.   
 When it comes to the terminology of peacekeeping vs. peacebuilding, the UN 
makes the following definitions and distinctions between the two: 
 
The boundaries between conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding 
and peace enforcement have become increasingly blurred. Peace operations are rarely 
limited to one type of activity. While UN peacekeeping operations are, in principle, 
deployed to support the implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement, they are 
often required to play an active role in peacemaking efforts and may also be involved in 
early peacebuilding activities. Peacebuilding aims to reduce the risk of lapsing or 
relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict 
management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. It is a 
complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace 
(UN Peacekeeping: Terminology).  
 
Similarly to the UN, Japan also tends to use its peace operations terminology 
interchangeably in its communiqué, as Peng Er (2008, p. 46) details:  
 
―For example, when Tokyo talks about its ‗full-scale‘ peacebuilding in Cambodia, it 
includes diplomatic efforts toward a peace agreement, the dispatch of personnel to the 
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and cooperation in social 
and economic reconstruction‖. 
   
When measured in absolute US dollar value, Japan was the top global donor for 
most of the 1990s, or as some argued, it had consequently emerged as a new type of 
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superpower. However, in 2001 this phenomenal period came to an end as, Japan had to 
cut down on its aid budget due to the on-going stagnation of its economy. Meanwhile, 
competing aid donor countries were increasing their aid allocations. Both of these 
factors synergistically, contributed to the end of an era of Japan‟s top donor status (Jain 
2016, p. 96). According to Hirata (2002, p. 175), the focus of Japan‟s aid giving had 
shifted from quantity to quality. Furthermore, humanitarian and technical development 
cooperation of the grassroots variety had proliferated during the late 1990s and early 
2000s, as well as cooperation with various NGOs (ibid.). In addition, ODA partnerships 
were offered not just to NGOs, but also to local governments and universities in Japan 
(MOFA 2014, p. 4).   
Amidst continuing economic stagnation, mounting national debt, demographic 
decline and the shock of Japan losing its economic superpower status, the perception 
and support for foreign aid was changing. The public image and political perception of 
ODA suffered substantial setbacks in the late 1990s and early 2000s. As the 
representative of ODA both domestically and internationally, it was the MOFA that, 
was at the center of the controversies. The first controversy was the increased untying of 
aid, that the MOFA argued, was necessary in order to conform to international standards 
of foreign aid giving. Back in 1987, Japanese companies received 55 % of loan 
contracts, as the loans were tied to contracts and purchases from the Japanese private 
sector. This practice was becoming increasingly rare over the years, as by 1999, the 
figure had dropped to a mere 19 %. Consequently, ODA was perceived to be against the 
economic interests of Japan by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dominated political 
elite and the business community (Arase 2005, pp. 3-4). This demonstrated the 
fundamental cultural value difference between the western and Japanese norms of 
charity giving.  
Other scandals and controversies continued to plague the public image of ODA 
in Japan, and its mouthpiece, the MOFA. Since Sino-Japanese relations were on the 
decline in the late 1990s, the public started questioning the validity of granting such vast 
sums of ODA loans to China. On average, mainland China was receiving $1 billion a 
year from Japan in concessional loans. In addition, as China‟s economic status and 
prestige was rising, while Japan‟s was on the decline, in combination with the rising 
military spending of China (including WMD testing and development), skepticism of 
Sino-Japanese development cooperation was not unfounded. ODA to China was 
questioned once more when in 2002; North Korean refugees were detained by force 
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from a Japanese consulate in Shenyang, Northeastern China by the local authorities 
(ibid. pp. 4-5). 
The 1990s brought significant changes to Japan‟s ODA policy. The collapse of 
the USSR, the end of the Cold War and the establishment of the newly independent 
states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, were great shocks to the international system 
and consequently, these events had ramifications on the development cooperation 
policies of major donor countries. In 1992, the original ODA Charter was released by 
the MOFA, which laid down the underlying philosophy, principles and priorities of 
Japan‟s foreign aid program. In addition, Japan‟s ODA became substantially more 
aligned with western values and norms, and it also became more similar with western 
aid programs. Furthermore, during the 1990s, Japan also ventured into the domains of 
peacebuilding and peacekeeping, which are considered as components of its 
contemporary development cooperation scheme. Despite the amassing economic and 
fiscal woes, in addition to public scandals related to ODA, Japan still maintained its 
high spending commitment approach to ODA also during the 1990s.      
 
2.4 The 2000s and Beyond 
 
Following the golden years of Japan‟s aid giving prestige and high spending, amid 
seemingly never-ending financial and fiscal woes, donor fatigue became a public 
phenomenon in Japan. That being said, Japan is hardly the only significant donor 
country that has experienced major public donor fatigue and skepticism, as a similar 
phenomenon has been observed in other high profile donor countries as well, such as 
the US (Kawai & Takagi 2004, p. 270). Hugh (2008, p. 213) rephrased the public‟s 
sentiment in the following way: ―Since the late 1990s, many Japanese have been 
asking: why should Japan‘s foreign aid be the largest in the world, even surpassing the 
U.S., when Japan has so many domestic economic and financial problems?‖ In addition 
to fiscal criticisms, Japan‟s ODA policy has domestically in the early 2000s been 
criticized for its perceived lack of transparency, giving aid to hostile and militarizing 
China, and for its strong focus on large infrastructure projects, at the expense of soft 
infrastructure and social development (Kawai & Takagi 2004, p. 270). Amid such 
conditions and criticisms and quite possibly in response to them, the ODA Charter was 
revised in 2003 by the Government of Japan.  
 The Charter of 2003 recognized that, changes were necessary in ODA policy, in 
order for Japanese aid to be effective in combating contemporary developmental and 
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transnational issues. In tune with the times, the Charter expressed worry of terrorism, 
transnational crime, infectious diseases, increasing religious and ethnic conflicts, 
poverty, rising income equality, gender issues and so on (MOFA 2003). One of the 
differences in comparison to the original charter, the 2003 revision includes the concept 
of human security as a priority for Japan‟s aid in the following years. In aid policy 
discourse the concept of human security, has been defined as „freedom from fear‟ and as 
„freedom from want‟ (Lewis-Workman 2018, pp. 91-92).      
   Zappa (2018, p. 408) has described, what he defines as, the „human turn‟ of 
Japanese ODA in the 2000s as a dichotomy between national interests (kokueki), and 
international affiliation (tsukiai). In addition, he attributes the changes in aid policy to 
certain key actors or intellectual entrepreneurs, such as the former United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCF) Ogata Sadako and the former Foreign Minister 
Kawaguchi Yoriko. According to Zappa, Ogata and Kawaguchi played the most 
important roles in the initial ODA reform in the early years of the new millennium, 
which were plagued by a number of corruption and bribery scandals related to Japan‟s 
aid program (ibid. p. 414). In addition, Asplund (2015, p. 2) attributes the revision of 
the ODA Charter in 2003, to the lowering domestic support for foreign aid and to the 
international community‟s adoption of the UN‟s Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). Much like the original Charter of 1992, the 2003 revision echoed the same 
support for the liberal western ideals of democracy and the respect for human rights. 
However, unlike the original Charter, the revision promised priority to those recipient 
nations that actively strive for democracy and human rights for its citizens (ibid.).  
 As discussed by Kurusu and Kersten (2011, pp. 115, 116, 127), in addition to 
Canada and Norway, Japan was one of the first states to adopt and actively promote the 
concept of human security in the late 1990s and the 2000s. Starting from 1998, human 
security became one of the core pillars of Japan‟s general foreign policy. In addition to 
being included in the 2003 ODA Charter, it was also included in the JICA‟s guidelines 
and in a 2005 midterm policy paper on ODA, in which, human security stood out as the 
top concept. Furthermore, the concept was described with the following words: ―a way 
of thinking that makes each individual a central concern, in other words through 
protecting and empowering individuals or communities that are under immediate 
threat, aiming to create a society where each individual can live in dignity (ibid. p. 
128).”     
 According to Nikitina and Furuoka (2008, pp. 1, 19), the institutional setup of 
Japan‟s ODA was overwhelmingly complex prior to a major revision, which took place 
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in 2001. In the old system of foreign aid administration, there were a total of ten 
different government ministries and agencies involved, which involved a lot of fighting 
for influence, funding and prestige between the different institutions involved in ODA 
policy. Despite the reform, which shrunk the institutional framework considerably, this 
is still an administrative issue in Japan‟s ODA. In addition to the MOFA, JICA, MOF 
and METI, there were three additional institutional players involved in the actual 
dispensing of ODA, namely: the JEXIM, the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) and the 
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) (ibid.).  
Later in 2008, the JEXIM was renamed as the Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation (JBIC), and the department responsible for the ODA loan provisions in the 
JBIC was merged together with the JICA. This decision made the administration and 
delivery of ODA much less institutionally fragmented and more centralized, as now, the 
loans, technical assistance and grants were all under the same grand organization, the 
JICA (Kato et al. 2016, p. 5).        
 The second revision of the ODA Charter was released in February 2015, and it 
was also renamed as the Development Cooperation Charter. This revision and 
rebranding of the Charter was pushed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe himself, in order to 
facilitate increased strategic use of ODA, and to better contribute to the peace and 
stability of the international system. The most remarkable change in the second revision 
is the fact that, it permits Japan‟s ODA to be dispensed to foreign armed forces for non-
military uses, such as for disaster rescue. However, such cases of foreign military use of 
ODA shall be reviewed and decided individually (Asplund 2015, p. 2). Considering the 
recent reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, also spearheaded by 
Prime Minister Abe, this development aligns neatly with Abe‟s general foreign and 
national defense policy direction.         
 Consequently, the post-2015 ODA of Japan is increasingly focused on regional 
security cooperation, peacebuilding and human security. Since Japan has been lacking 
in its ability to project military power internationally, due to its constitutional 
limitations, according to Gaens (2015, p. 4) Japan has adopted a similar rhetoric to the 
European Union in international forums. In other words, Japan has been framing itself 
as a great civilian and humanitarian power in recent years. That being said, the 
ambitious infrastructure projects of which Japan‟s ODA is known for, still play a 
considerable role in the overall aid program. Consequently, two examples of such 
projects in the Philippines namely: the Metro Manila Subway Project (MMSP) in the 
capital region, and the construction of the New Bohol International Airport on the 
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Panglao Island, will be discussed in the later chapters of this thesis. In relation to 
peacebuilding and human security, Japan‟s role in the Mindanao peace-process will be 
explored in Chapter 3.3 respectively.  
 The 2000s and 2010s were undoubtedly revolutionary years in the history of the 
development and progress of Japan‟s development cooperation policy and its 
implementation. During the years 2001 and 2008, the institutional set-up of Japan‟s 
ODA program was reorganized and streamlined to a considerable degree. This 
reorganization most notably resulted in the JICA becoming a true power house for 
Japan‟s development cooperation, not just in its implementation around the globe, but 
also in allocating grants and loans for developmental and humanitarian projects. Despite 
domestic donor fatigue and continuing financial and economic challenges, Japan has 
nevertheless, consistently been developing its ODA program towards a more 
humanitarian and grassroots focused direction, while at the same time, it continues to be 
one of the largest ODA donor countries in the world. Thanks to the efforts of Ogata 
Sadako and Kawaguchi Yoriko, the concept of human security was integrated to Japan‟s 
foreign policy, and subsequently to its ODA policy, via the 2003 ODA Charter revision.  
 
 
2.5 Special Characteristics of Japan’s ODA 
 
Over the last 60 years of Japanese ODA, the program has been modified significantly, 
as a response to harsh criticisms from western aid donors, international organizations 
and NGOs. However, Japan has none the less managed to maintain its underlying aid 
philosophy and it has modified and adjusted its ODA based on past successes and 
failures. In addition, Japan‟s ODA model has clearly influenced other East-Asian 
nations that have established their own ODA programs in recent times (for instance: 
South Korea and Taiwan). Therefore, one can conclude that, the success of Japanese 
ODA as an alternative form of development cooperation to the western ODA model, 
has given Japan unintentional soft power as a prime donor country to emulate (Jain 
2016, pp. 94-95). 
 Meanwhile, many aspects of the aid program that attracted criticism from the 
international community in the past have been significantly improved, or from another 
perspective, these aspects have become increasingly conforming to the western ideals of 
development cooperation. One example of this was the significant and progressive 
untying of Japan‟s aid funds, which was discussed in Chapters 2.2 and 2.3 respectively. 
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The controversy and international condemnation regarding the tying of Japanese aid 
relates to the fact that, in the early decades of the aid program and especially during the 
war reparations period, Japan‟s aid funds were heavily tied to the purchase of Japanese 
products and services.  
Similarly, Japan has been criticized for its high proportion of loans in relation to 
grant aid, which relates directly to its underlying self-help philosophy. However, 
contemporarily it is fair to conclude that Japan has improved its aid policy drastically 
when it comes to the tying of aid. The share of untied aid in Japan‟s ODA has increased 
from 25,8% in 1980 to 96,4% in 1999 (Kawai & Takagi 2004, pp. 264-265). Other 
prominent and extinguishing features of Japanese ODA have been: assistance based on 
recipient requests, the emphasis on large scale infrastructure projects, strong role of 
recipient government and the emphasis on bilateral aid (ibid. pp. 266-269).        
Generally speaking, there are several noticeable characteristics that make 
Japan‟s ODA policy and implementation remarkable in international comparison. In 
terms of geographical allocation, the vast majority of Japan‟s ODA (including both 
grant aid and loans) has been distributed to recipient countries in Asia. Although Japan 
has been able to increase its aid allocation to developing countries in other regions of 
the globe, the proportion targeting Asia is still the most substantial. As an illustration, 
the proportion of loans and grants to Asian countries in the early 1970s was in the range 
of 90 %, while in 1999 the proportion was still at 70 % of bilateral aid. Based on the 
most recent OECD data for 2015-2016, of the top 10 recipient countries of Japan‟s 
ODA, only Iraq and Afghanistan stood out from a list of South- and SEA nations 
(OECD 2017).  
On the other hand, according to der Veen‟s statistical analysis of the 
geographical distribution of aid from various major donor countries (2011, p. 175): ―A 
few states appear to be favorites of all donors‖. Some analysts have even suggested that 
there is a clear division of labor among the DAC donor nations, with the US supplying 
Latin America with aid, Europe doing so to Africa and finally, Japan doing its part in 
Asia (ibid.). However, a multitude of historical, colonial, trade and political factors is 
likely a more sound explanation to the phenomenon.      
 One phenomenon that has remained constant over the decades is the infighting 
for political power, funding and influence between the different ministries, behind the 
ODA policy, and in its actual implementation in the receiving countries. As discussed 
by Jain (2016 p. 96), the different parties in this infighting have been: the MOFA, the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). 
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The budget of the foreign aid program is controlled by the MOF, which favors yen 
loans as opposed to grant aid, due to their interest rate albeit the interests are very 
conservative and lenient on the borrower (ibid.). In addition to this, the MOF also 
strives to contribute to international financial institutions through the ODA policy (Kato 
et al. 2016, p. 6). The METI on the other hand, favors Japanese business interests 
related to the ODA. Lastly, the MOFA is the least nationalistic of the ministries, as it 
tends to side with DACs and UNs‟ norms when it comes to foreign aid. In addition, 
MOFA is also concerned with the image of Japan internationally and with Japan‟s close 
relations with the US (Jain 2016 p. 96).  
 Outside of the aforementioned ministries, there are also other government 
institutions that play a role in ODA policy, albeit their budget and influence has been on 
the decline for a while. The most notable is perhaps the Ministry of Education, Culture, 
Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), which hands out scholarships through the 
ODA program. Because of the decline in ODA decision-making of several government 
ministries, other than the MOFA, MOF and METI, and also due to the merger of the 
JBIC and the JICA, the high degree of institutional fragmentation that once 
characterized Japan‟s ODA for decades, is increasingly in the past (Kato et al. 2016, p. 
6). 
 There are three main characteristics in Japan‟s ODA that have been consistent 
over the course of the history of Japanese ODA program. These characteristics are 
namely: the large proportion of loans against grants in total ODA volume, the self-help 
and the request-based principle. In regards to the first characteristic, Japan‟s share of 
grants during the period of 1990 – 2000 was around 40% of its total ODA. In 
comparison to other DAC donor countries, such as France and Germany, the same 
figure is 80% and 70% respectively. This fact has often been a point of criticism 
towards Japan‟s ODA and Japan often defends its high proportion of loans by referring 
to the self-help principle, and how loans in contrast to grants, promote fiscal 
responsibility on the part of the receiving nation. Naturally, both grant aid and loan aid 
have their plusses and minuses and consequently, around the turn of the millennium, 
there were big debates on their appropriate use among donor countries. Eventually, a 
consensus emerged that, there is a right time and place for each type of aid. Japan also 
embraced this principle and started allocating grant aid for the most vulnerable of aid 
receiving countries i.e. sub-Saharan Africa, while allocating loan aid to the more well 
off ones, i.e. SEA (ibid. p. 7). 
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Japan‟s foreign aid being based on recipient requests is a characteristic, which 
has been present ever since the dawn of Japan‟s foreign aid program. In fact, the origins 
of this principle have been traced back to the war reparations of the 1950s. It is also 
based on, what can be described as, a sense of respect for the recipient countries 
autonomy, as in the recipient country knowing what it needs to develop the most. 
However, this principle seems to be in a state of flux recently, as the 2015 Development 
Cooperation Charter states that Japan should take a more active role in negotiations with 
recipient countries (ibid.). Thus one can see evidence of increasing conformity growing 
towards western ODA ideals. 
For all the different factors and reasons stated, Japan‟s ODA can be considered 
to be a developmental cooperation model of its own. This model has historically 
supported the recovery and growth of the Japanese economy, while at the same time, 
respecting the sovereignty of developing countries and culturing their sense of fiscal 
responsibility and dignity. However, in recent decades since Japanese ODA has been 
largely untied, the pure business interests in it have consequently faded. In some aspects 
Japan‟s ODA policy has become more like those of the western nations. Despite this on 
other fields, which have become focus points for ODA policy, such as securitization and 
peacebuilding (human security), it does not appear to be so. This will be further 
discussed in Chapter 5 and 3.3.         
 
  
2.6 Discussion of Norms, Motives and Values 
 
The great watershed moment in regards to, motivations and norms surrounding Japan‟s 
ODA policy came in 1992, when the first ODA Charter was released by the 
Government of Japan. Prior to this turning point, Japan‟s ODA was often perceived in 
the international community as serving solely the economic self-interests of the 
Japanese government and industry. Such criticisms and allegations heightened during 
the turn to the 1990s and it even spawned the famous colloquial term “checkbook 
diplomacy” (Zappa 2018, p. 409). Another major characteristic of the pre-Charter ODA 
was resource pooling in alignment with the US-Japan Security Alliance and the Cold 
War effort. In relation to this, Fujisaki (et al. 1997, p. 521) details regarding the 
expansion of Japan‟s ODA in the 1970s: “This rapid expansion was buttressed by 
pressure from western countries, especially the U.S., on Japan to share a greater 
financial burden for the collective global security”.    
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The main changes that came with the ODA Charter were; the incorporation of 
norms championed by the western countries such as: democratization and 
humanitarianism. This was not simply rhetoric as even prior to the ratification of the 
Charter, Japan cut its aid from Myanmar following military coup of 1988. 
Subsequently, Japan acted similarly also towards China in 1989 following the 
Tiananmen Square Massacre. Another important change that came with the Charter and 
its later revisions was the incorporation of humanitarian assistance in conflict ridden 
regions, which spawned assistance projects in Timor-Leste (1999), Afghanistan (2003) 
and Sri Lanka (2004) respectively (Lewis-Workman 2018, pp. 88-89). 
 In hindsight of these changes, it can be said that, Japan‟s ODA became more in 
line with western values and norms concerning foreign aid and development 
cooperation as a whole (ibid.). This relatively new focus on humanitarianism and 
peacebuilding is also present in the Philippines, as Japan has been an active participant 
in conflict resolution, humanitarian assistance, disaster preparedness and in assisting 
infrastructure improvement and economic development in Mindanao of southern 
Philippines. Further discussion concerning these efforts will commence in chapter 2.3. 
From 1998 onwards, the concept of human security had become central in 
Japan‟s foreign policy. Japan has also been promoting the concept in international 
arenas, such as, the UN General Assembly and by financially contributing to the United 
Nations‟ Trust Fund for Human Security (Kurusu & Kersten 2011, p. 116). Through the 
revision of the ODA Charter in 2003, human security came to the fore, as one of the 
basic principles of 21
st
 century ODA policy. To be precise, it was described in the 
Charter in the following manner (MOFA 2003, p. 2):  
 
―In order to address direct threats to individuals such as conflicts, disasters, infectious 
diseases, it is important not only to consider the global, regional, and national 
perspectives, but also to consider the perspective of human security, which focuses on 
individuals. Accordingly, Japan will implement ODA to strengthen the capacity of local 
communities through human resource development. To ensure that human dignity is 
maintained at all stages, from the conflict stage to the reconstruction and development 
stages, Japan will extend assistance for the protection and empowerment of individuals 
(ibid.).” 
 
It kept its place in the 2015 revision however, instead of using the heading 
“perspective of human security”, it was instead changed to “promoting human security”, 
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under the basic policies of the Charter (MOFA 2003, p. 2; MOFA 2015, p. 4). The 
verbatim description of this basic policy is the following:  
 
―Human security - a concept that pursues the right of individuals to live happily and in 
dignity, free from fear and want, through their protection and empowerment - is the 
guiding principle that lies at the foundation of Japan's development cooperation. Japan 
will thus focus its development cooperation on individuals - especially those liable to be 
vulnerable such as children, women, persons with disabilities, the elderly, refugees and 
internally-displaced persons, ethnic minorities, and indigenous peoples - and provide 
cooperation for their protection and empowerment so as to realize human security. At 
the same time, Japan will make efforts so that this basic policy will be understood and 
accepted widely among its partner countries, thereby mainstreaming the concept even  
further in the international community‖(MOFA 2015, p. 4.). 
 
As can be observed from the extracts above, the MOFA has not only kept human 
security as a central concept in Japan‟s ODA, but it has also taken a more central and 
pronounced role in it, as is evident when comparing the extracts from the 2003 and 
2015 ODA Charter revisions to each other. In addition, it appears that Japan has taken 
an active role in convincing its ally and partner nations to embrace human security as 
well. What is perhaps the most peculiar notion about Japan‟s newly found affinity with 
the concept, is the concept‟s clear focus on the individual, rather than the collective, 
which seems more western than Asian from a societal and traditionalist point of view. 
Nevertheless, as the secondary research objective of this thesis is to find out how this 
concept of human security particularly as it is framed and described above, corresponds 
in Japan‟s ODA implementation in the Philippines, it will be further analyzed and 
discussed in Chapter 4.  
According to a statistical research on aid giving done by Alesina and Dollar 
(2000, pp. 22-23), Japan‟s aid allocations during the study period of 1970 – 1974 and 
1990 - 1994, is highly correlated with UN voting patterns. In other words, aid recipient 
countries that vote with, or for Japan‟s proposals in the UN, receive higher amounts of 
aid according to their research. Meanwhile, Strand and Tuman (2012, p. 425) found out 
a correlation between Japanese ODA to microstates and their International Whaling 
Commission (IWC) memberships. However, the authors also found that, neither Japan‟s 
commercial interests nor the interests of the US had any correlation with predicting 
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Japan‟s ODA allocation patterns. On the other hand, Strand and Tuman found such a 
correlation with humanitarian concerns instead (ibid.).   
In addition to human security, Japan‟s contemporary foreign policy, of which 
ODA is a high profile component of, is often stated to ascribe to the concept of 
proactive pacifism. In official guidelines of the Ministry of Defense for 2014, it is 
simply defined as: “proactively contributing to peace, based on international 
cooperation”. Moreover, this necessitates among other actions “actively promoting 
security cooperation with other countries‖ (Weston 2014, p. 169), which on an 
ideological level explains Japan‟s increasing security cooperation with the Philippines. 
Both human security and proactive pacifism can be seen as complementing concepts as 
the foundations of Japan‟s foreign policy as, human security focuses on the security of 
individuals comprehensively while, proactive pacifism is concerned with the 
international level of peacebuilding.    
 
 
 
2.7 Summary 
 
As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, the history of Japan‟s ODA policy and its 
development have gone through distinct phases in the past 60 years. The period from 
the year 2000 to the present is characterized most notably by the breakthrough of 
humanitarian norms into Japanese ODA policy, which can be observed both from policy 
documents (the ODA Charters) and from policy implementation (for instance: 
peacebuilding in Mindanao). This breakthrough of humanitarian norms can be at least 
partially explained by the influence and promotion of said norms by influential 
individuals in high positions, such as; Kawaguchi Yoriko and Ogata Sadako. However, 
at the same time one can observe the increasing securitization of aid by the Abe 
government as a geopolitical tool to counter the increasingly assertive China in the 
South China Sea region. Thus, in relation to the developmental and historical frames of 
Japan‟s ODA as defined by Hirata (2002, p. 165), the author would describe the current 
era as that of embracing the concept of human security and increasing securitization of 
Japan‟s ODA.  
     Through historical events, international critique and through Japan‟s adoption 
of UN‟s and western nations‟ norms, its aid policy has changed considerably from its 
early post World War II phase as an aid and business facilitator. Some contentious 
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characteristics in Japan‟s aid policy such as; tying aid excessively with domestic 
business interests and lacking an underlying aid philosophy, have subsequently been 
addressed by policy makers. Meanwhile, several contentious characteristics still persist 
such as; high proportion of loan versus grant aid, dominance of large infrastructure 
projects, developing nations in Asia receiving most of the aid and, the need for recipient 
nations to propose viable projects for ODA funding (self-help principle/request-based 
assistance). However, focusing on the differences between the development cooperation 
model of that of the western nations and that of Japan, while implying that the latter 
should conform to the former, fails to recognize the Japanese model as distinct from its 
western equivalent.   
 In hindsight of this evolution of Japanese ODA, the bilateral development 
cooperation with the Philippines provides an interesting case study, due to its equivalent 
duration with the overall ODA program since the war reparations in the 1950s. On a 
similar note, this bilateral development cooperation has evolved and become 
increasingly multifaceted, as will be demonstrated in the further chapters of this thesis. 
However, at the same time some of the core values and characteristics of the Japanese 
development model have remained the same and are visibly recognizable in Japan‟s 
contemporary development cooperation with the Philippines.    
 
 
3.0 Bilateral Relations and Development Cooperation 
 
In relation to Japanese foreign aid to SEA during the 1970s and 1980s, Orr (1990, p. 81) 
stated the following; ―The Philippines is perhaps the most controversial and, arguably 
from a political perspective, the most important country on Japan‘s aid agenda in 
Southeast Asia‖. Despite the fact that, Japan‟s ODA to the Philippines declined as a 
consequence of the termination of war reparations transactions in 1976, the island 
nation resurged to the top of the recipient country list of Japan‟s ODA during the 1980s. 
The reason why Orr labeled the bilateral development cooperation of the time as 
controversial was partly due to a domestic political scandal in Japan regarding the 
misuse and embezzlement of ODA funds, by the brutal and undemocratic Ferdinand 
Marcos regime. This particular case will be further discussed in Chapter 3.1 and 3.6 
respectively. Second factor stirring controversy in the Japanese Diet in the 1980s, was 
related to a perception of Japan‟s aid to the Philippines solely serving US strategic 
interests (ibid. p. 82).  
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Generally speaking, the Philippines has historically been a bit of an enigma for 
Japan, as it has until very recently been very closely associated with the US, which 
stems from the history of it being a US colony and subsequently, a location for US 
overseas military bases. These commonalities between Japan and the Philippines 
however, in a geopolitical sense, are without a doubt mostly a strength, because of the 
strategic location of the Philippines when it comes to commercial sea-lanes towards 
Japan and increasingly, countering the growing influence of China in the region. 
Furthermore, the US has also been a major aid provider to the country in a similar 
manner as Japan (Pante & Reyes 1991, pp. 121-135; Figure 5). Moreover, according to 
Asanuma (1991, p. 111) Japan‟s ODA rarely concentrates towards a country in which, 
the US has a strong presence and strategic interest in, the Philippines being a notable 
exception to this trend. Consequently, the ODA programs of the US and Japan in the 
Philippines can be seen as either competing or complementing models. Such a 
triangular geopolitical alliance between the US, Japan and the Philippines, which 
encompasses security, development and commercial matters, is rather exceptional in the 
East- and SEA regions.    
 In the 21
st
 century, the Philippines and Japan have become important strategic 
and economic partners. According to De Castro (2017, pp. 35, 36), Japan is the largest 
foreign investor and a significant trade partner with the Philippines. For instance in 
2015, trade with Japan totaled at $18.8 billion in value, which represented 14.5% of the 
total Philippine economy. More than 1,500 companies from Japan operate in the 
Philippines, mostly in Business Process Outsourcing (PBO) and in industrial production 
(Go 2018). In 2017, the JICA was the largest contributor of ODA to the country, 
sending over a total amount of 5.33 billion USD of ODA, which amounted to 36 % of 
the Philippines‟ total ODA portfolio (NEDA 2018, p. 13; Figure 5). The free flow of 
goods, services and even labor to a limited extent is enabled by the bilateral JPEPA, 
which was signed already back in 2008.  
In addition, the Philippines has an ample supply of labor, especially in the health 
care and service sector. Since the standard of living and salaries are much higher in 
Japan then in the Philippines, the Japanese job market is very attractive to current and 
prospective Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). However, because of the steep 
language barrier, high training requirements and strict immigration rules of Japan, the 
labor movement has been restricted so far (Nieva-Nishimori 2018). In the future, the 
situation regarding Filipino immigration to Japan is subject to change since, the Abe 
government recently announced to relax the immigration rules for foreign manual labor. 
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The Japanese ambassador to the Philippines Koji Haneda estimated that, under this 
scheme, 50,000 OFWs will enter the Japanese work force by 2025. Since so far, Japan 
has only allowed highly and educated skilled labor to enter its work force from abroad, 
mainly university educated professionals, such as engineers and academics, have been 
able to do so. However, as a consequence of the JPEPA, limited numbers of Filipino 
nurses have been allowed to engage in labor in Japan since 2008 (Go 2018). Despite 
this, Ambassador Haneda also stated that, the number of OFWs in Japan already 
amounts to 153,600 which, accounts to 12 % of the total foreign work force in the 
country (Manila Standard 2018). Since remittances sent by OFWs back to the 
Philippines amount to a significant amount of foreign income for the developing nation 
(Advincula-Lopez 2005, p. 58), in regards to bilateral development cooperation, the 
relaxation of labor immigration rules is a welcomed decision by the Abe government.       
 
 
3.1 History 
 
Contacts and trade relations between Japan and the Philippines reach far back into the 
pre-modern era. However, when it comes to the post-World War II period, trade and 
investment into the Philippines began slowly trickling in the 1960s. The lack of prior 
bilateral economic activity was due to Filipino hostilities following World War II 
towards the Japanese, due to the prior occupation of the archipelago and the huge 
damages caused by the Battle of Manila among other such dreadful incidents. It was not 
until the declaration of martial law in 1972 and the signing of the Treaty of Amity, 
Commerce and Navigation with Japan that, Japanese investments into the Philippines 
truly begun to accelerate. Japan reached the second place behind the US in foreign 
investments at the end of the 1970s, and it reached the top position during the years of 
1988 and 1993 when the total investments amounted to $946.389 million. The amount 
of Japanese investment to the Philippines stayed at a high level during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s with moderate fluctuations. However, during these years the amount of 
ODA funds flowing into country were on average five times higher than investments 
(Warkentin et al. 1996, pp. 156-158).    
In recent years since 2011, the bilateral relations have reached a previously 
unexplored area of regional security and defense. Originally in 2011, the former Prime 
Minister Yoshihiko Noda of Japan and the former President Benigno Aquino III of the 
Philippines signed a joint declaration, declaring a strategic partnership between the two 
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nations. Subsequently, in 2015 this partnership was strengthened and expanded into the 
realm of security cooperation by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the former President 
Aquino, for the benefit of maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, 
facilitating economic growth and striving towards human security in the region. The 
crucial difference with the 2015 declaration in comparison to previous joint 
communiqués was the inclusion of practical security and defense cooperation between 
Japan and the Philippines. The bilateral cooperation of the previous decades and 
administrations had solely focused on trade, investment and development cooperation 
(ODA) and thus, it was an unprecedented development. The practicality of this security 
and defense cooperation encompasses the transfer of defense technology, equipment 
and the conduct of joint naval exercises (Trinidad 2017). 
Based on the recent changes on the reinterpretation of the Japanese 
Constitutions‟ Article 9, and the peculiarities of Philippine Republic‟s strong 
presidential system in conjunction with geopolitical changes in the region vis-à-vis 
China and the US respectively, much can be expected from the increasing security and 
maritime defense cooperation of the two nations (Grønning 2018). However, further 
details and developments of this cooperation will be discussed more deeply in Chapter 5 
of this thesis.          
As a sign of mutuality in the bilateral relations as, well as in development 
cooperation, during the aftermath of the 1995 Kobe Hanshin earthquake in Japan, the 
Philippines and other nations, offered to provide rescue and humanitarian assistance to 
the affected areas in Japan. After a notably delay, the Japanese government accepted the 
assistance on the basis that, it will reciprocally convince these countries to accept 
Japan‟s ODA in the future (Söderberg et al. 1996, p. 31). In addition, following the 
devastation of the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011, the Philippines sent a medical 
team to the tsunami and earthquake affected areas to help victims of the disaster in the 
Iwate and Miyagi Prefectures. Peculiarly, the JICA also made an educational disaster 
preparedness DVD by filming and interviewing Filipinos in Japan, who were affected 
by the 2011 earthquake and tsunami (JICA 2012, pp. 2, 7). These aforementioned cases 
display how the bilateral development cooperation is not a one-way flow of assistance, 
but a reciprocal exchange between Japan and the Philippines. Naturally, because of the 
massive wealth and development cap between the two nations, the degree and amount 
of contribution is in proportion to it.     
Japan‟s ODA to the Philippines has not gone without its own public scandals 
and controversies. A case in point is the so called „Marcos Scandal‟, which took place 
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following the People Power Revolution of 1986 in the Philippines, which concluded the 
rule of Dictator Ferdinand Marcos and made him and his wife flee the country to 
Hawaii. Upon entry, the US customs confiscated documents from the Marcos‟s, that 
documented bribery involving the Marcos family and several Japanese trading 
companies (Hirata 2002, p. 89). At the center of this scandal was Ferdinand Marco‟s old 
fraternity brother from his alma mater, Roberto Benedicto, who was personally 
appointed as an ambassador to Japan by Marcos himself. Benedicto used his position as 
an ambassador to act as a middleman between local sugar producers in the Philippines 
and investors in Japan, amassing massive profits. He was also found out to have 
received over $550 million of Japan‟s war reparations, which he used for personal 
business investments (Martial Law Museum).    
The degree of corruption involved in the Marcos Scandal was deemed 
systematic at the time and it also involved Japanese ODA loans to the Philippines. 
Through the confiscated documents, it was revealed that, the Japanese firms involved 
had been paying bribes to the Marcos family and its associates through Filipino 
companies, which were estimated to constitute to 10 to 15 % of the ODA loans 
involved. The Marcos Scandal drew public attention to the misuse of ODA by Japanese 
firms and spurred skepticism towards corporate authority in general (Hirata 2002, p. 
89).  
 In the 2000s, a point of both grassroots and mainstream tension has been in 
relation to the JPEPA ratified in 2006 and finally implemented in 2008, following six 
long years of negotiation and a strenuous approval process in the Philippines (De Haar 
2011, pp. 114). The oligarchic status quo in the Philippine economy and politics, 
coupled with a lack of tradition in regards to free trade and Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs), and in hindsight of an extensive history of protectionism, it comes as no 
surprise that the ratification of the JPEPA was such an arduous process. The civil 
society, labor unions and even high profile priests from the Catholic Church got into 
public debates and activism, both for and against the JPEPA. The public debate centered 
around environmental issues and whether the FTA would be beneficial to the Philippine 
economy as a whole or not (ibid. pp. 114-129).  
In regards to the former, environmental concerns were based on an interpretation 
of a clause in the treaty, which would allegedly grant the dumping of Japanese waste in 
the Philippines. These concerns were fueled by a collective memory of an incident in 
1992, in which, a mislabeled container from Japan in Manila seaport turned out to 
contain harmful waste. The hazardous container was subsequently shipped back to 
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Japan, but the legacy of the event lives on. A similar incident took place in 2006, as 
local farmers claimed that a plot of land in Cavite, on the south side of Manila, had been 
reserved for Japanese waste dumping. Despite the fact that the claim was completely 
unfounded, after much ballyhoo fueled by anti-JPEPA NGOs, it warranted an official 
response as in a bilateral meeting, Prime Minister Abe had to confirm to President 
Arroyo, that Japan would not be engaging in any waste dumping on the Philippines 
(ibid. p. 129).   
Overall, the bilateral relations between Japan and the Philippines have an 
extensive and at times even tumultuous history. Despite Japan‟s Imperialist past and its 
consequences to the Philippines, the bilateral relations and cooperation in many fields, 
have been cemented and broadened considerably in the 20
th
 and 21th centuries. Bilateral 
development cooperation, which begun as war reparations from Japan to the 
Philippines, has evolved to encompass regional security cooperation, as well as, 
becoming increasingly reciprocal, albeit in proportion to national wealth. Moreover, 
through the Philippines‟ disaster relief efforts following the devastation caused by major 
earthquakes in Japan both in 1995 and 2011, one can observe the implementation of 
human security returning to Japan in a reciprocal manner. A major milestone in the 
bilateral relations was the signing and ratification of the JPEPA, which as often is the 
case with FTAs, has been a controversial agreement in the Philippines. Nevertheless, as 
Japan rather sparingly signs FTAs, especially with developing countries, the JPEPA can 
be considered as a major sign of increasing cooperation and partnership between the 
Philippines and Japan.      
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Figure 1. Top 10 Recipients of Japan‟s ODA. Source: 
https://donortracker.org/country/japan (accessed: 4.1.19). 
 
 
 
3.2 Infrastructure Projects 
 
This section of the thesis will discuss a recently completed infrastructure project (New 
Bohol [Panglao] International Airport), and an approved such ongoing project (MMSP), 
which have both been planned and funded by the JICA, in close collaboration with the 
Government of the Philippines. As discussed and noted by several authors (Hugh 2008, 
p. 196; Mitsuya 2007, p. 26; Kawai & Takagi 2004, pp. 267-268; Zappa 2018, p. 424), 
Japan‟s ODA policy has had a major emphasis on building and improvement of basic 
infrastructure in developing nations. The building of both hard (physical) and soft (non-
physical) infrastructure is also recognized in the 2015 revision of the Charter, as one of 
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the most important steps towards achieving quality growth, a higher standard of living 
and attracting foreign investments (MOFA 2015, pp. 5, 8, 12).  
In fact, the lack of adequate infrastructure both in the major urban metropolises 
and in the provinces is possibly the most substantial obstacle for an increased level of 
foreign investments, economic growth and that of standard of living in the Philippines. 
The state and standard of its urban, rural and even e-commerce infrastructure is 
considered of the lowest quality in the region (Clarete et al. 2018, p. 9). Consequently, 
the Philippines has been lacking behind other developing ASEAN states both in poverty 
reduction and growth rates, which has earned the Philippines the moniker “sick man of 
Asia”. Despite the country‟s natural resources, largely English-speaking and relatively 
well educated population, poverty and income equality seem to continue endemically 
(De Haar 2011, p. 114).  
The prominence of infrastructure building has been substantial in Japanese 
ODA, which has historically been one of the defining key differences between Japan‟s 
ODA model and implementation, and of those of the western nations (Kawai & Takagi 
2004, pp. 267-268). However, in recent decades Japan‟s ODA policy has started to 
emphasize more humanitarian and social forms of aid thus, pluralizing the development 
cooperation program (Fujisaki et al. 1997; Lewis-Workman 2018, pp. 95-96).  
This new emphasis on softer aid has appeared in tandem with the introduction of 
human security into Japan‟s foreign policy, in addition to, criticisms and influence from 
the DAC donor community. One of the most prominent cases of this is Japan‟s 
participation, through its ODA, in the peacebuilding efforts in Mindanao of the 
Southern Philippines (Lewis-Workman 2018, p. 95). Despite the aforementioned 
“softening” of Japan‟s ODA contemporarily, infrastructure still plays a major role, 
especially when it comes to the Philippines. For instance, according to NEDA statistics 
(2017, p. 1) more than half of Philippines‟ ODA loans portfolio (52% or 6.42 billion 
USD) for 2017 accounted for infrastructure development. Meanwhile, 42% of the total 
loans portfolio came from the JICA (5.17 billion USD). Furthermore, the current 
national infrastructure improvement program spearheaded by President Duterte titled, 
“Build, Build, Build”, includes several high profile JICA loan and collaboration projects 
including the MMSP and the New Bohol Airport (JICA 2017B, p. 9). 
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3.2.1 New Bohol Airport 
 
The New Bohol Airport on the Panglao Island in the Bohol region of the Philippines 
was recently completed in November 2018, and it is currently serving both international 
and domestic air traffic. The main impetus for the construction of a new higher capacity 
airport in the region is to better manage and facilitate the growth of tourism in the 
region, in a sustainable and environmentally conscious manner and thus, replacing the 
outdated Tagbilaran Airport as a regional air transport hub. The construction project 
was funded with a 15 billion yen loan from the JICA and its construction was contracted 
to the Chiyoda and Mitsubishi corporations as a joint venture (EOJ 2018; Airport 
Technology; Timetric 2017 p. 4). Earlier JICA funded airport construction projects in 
the Philippines include the expansion of Mactan-Cebu International Airport, which is 
the second busiest air hub in the nation (JICA 2000, p. 133).  
 In hindsight of the history of Japanese ODA model, such public-private 
partnership between a Japanese government agency and the private sector is rather 
quintessential and even notorious. However, the decision to grant the implementation of 
the project to the aforementioned Japanese contractors, took place following a bidding 
process among several competing construction contractors (Timetric 2017, p. 9). As the 
Bohol Island is largely an eco-tourism destination, the New Bohol Airport was designed 
in consideration of low environmental impact and energy usage. Consequently, it 
incorporates top-level Japanese technology both in its design and day-to-day operations. 
Among other measures and technologies, the surrounding soil is protected with geo-
textile sheets, in order to prevent the absorption of drainage water, petroleum and so on 
into the surrounding soil. Likewise, the airport utilizes solar energy to power its air 
condition in addition to, utilizing LEDs for its lighting requirements (Airport 
Technology). Furthermore, the recently opened airport has already been planned for 
expansion in the near future, enabled by a 4.37 billion yen loan agreement between the 
Ministry of Finance and the JICA (GMA News 2018).     
As an important milestone in the development and growth of tourism in the 
more peripheral province regions of the Philippines such as Bohol, the completion of a 
state of the art environmentally conscious air-hub, will undoubtedly assist to facilitate 
the growth of the tourism industry and the overall economic development in the region 
during the near future. However, when it comes to the former that is the case presuming, 
that the growth and flow of tourism to the region continues according to estimates. 
Possible future limitations on the growth and profitability of the aviation industry 
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caused by increasing political demands for carbon taxes on air travel may negatively 
affect the industry as it is. Furthermore, the vulnerability of the Philippines to intense 
typhoons on an annual basis, causes further challenges to both international and 
domestic aviation and consequently, to its tourism industry. On the other hand, in 
consideration of the challenging geography of the Philippines as a fragmented island 
nation, the improvement of air travel infrastructure is important for national economic 
development as a whole.        
      
 
3.2.2 Metro Manila Subway Project 
 
The extensive and populous capital region of the Philippines, Metro Manila, suffers 
from severe traffic congestion and an acute lack of adequate public transportation 
infrastructure. As a consequence of the high population density and poor urban 
planning, large scale infrastructure developments in the region are difficult and 
prohibitively costly to implement. However, according to Corpuz (et al. 2018, p. 143) 
inaction in this regard, would most likely be even more costly in the long term as the 
capital region continues to expand and grow in population. As a response to these 
challenges, the governments of Japan and the Philippines have approved a 50 billion 
Philippine Peso (PHP) loan from the JICA to finance the first phase for the construction 
of the MMSP. The MMSP Phase 1 will result in 25.3 km of underground rail and 
connect the main air hub of the country, the Ninoy Aquino International Airport 
(NAIA) to major urban business centers of Metro Manila, such as Quezon City and 
Makati (NEDA Sep. 2018; JICA 2017A, p. 11).  
 According to census data, the population in the capital region Metro Manila has 
grown from 7.92 million residents in 1990 to 12.88 million in 2015 meanwhile; its 
population density has increased up to 20,000 residents per square kilometer. Such an 
extreme figure makes Metro Manila‟s population density three times as high as that of 
Tokyo‟s. While Tokyo has arguably one of the best public transportation systems in the 
world, due to its extensive subway and rail network, the residents of Manila need to rely 
excessively on busses and jeepneys (makeshift minibuses) for their daily commuting 
needs and consequently, wasting hours daily on traffic congestion, as the local rail 
coverage is currently severely limited (JICA 2017a, pp. 10-11).  
 According to a NEDA-JICA co-report (2015, pp. 3-6), travel congestion in 
Metro Manila is estimated to have a daily cost of 2.4 billion PHP per day, including the 
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cost of operating a vehicle and the loss of time and consequently productivity because 
of traffic congestion. This figure is expected to rise to 6 billion PHP by 2030, if no 
action is taken on the matter. Moreover, the report also found out that, spending at least 
20 % of a month‟s income on transportation was a common occurrence for low-income 
families. As one of the basic policies of Japan‟s ODA is to promote human security 
(MOFA 2015, p. 4), which is also concerned with the negation of poverty, the 
improvement of infrastructure aligns well with the aforementioned goal.      
 Currently, the MMSP is without a doubt the JICA‟s most ambitious public 
infrastructure project in the Philippines. Upon completion, which is estimated to take 
place in 2025 (Department of Transportation [DOTR] & JICA 2017. p. 5), the MMSP 
will be the Philippines‟ first urban underground rail transportation system and surely, 
the most advanced and efficient public transportation system in the country. Contrary to 
the past administrations, the one currently lead by President Duterte is finally taking the 
country‟s infrastructure deficit seriously. Fueled by ODA and investments from Japan 
and China, in addition to increasing national tax revenue (Heydarian 2018a), Duterte‟s 
„Build, Build, Build‟ program is essentially attempting to lift the Philippines out of its 
poverty trap and sent it on a course of steady and sustainable economic growth and 
development.     
 Similarly, as in the case of the New Bohol Airport as discussed earlier in the 
thesis, a Japanese consortium including multiple high profile construction companies 
(including Tokyo Metro Co. Ltd.), won the bid for the construction of the MMSP 
(Caraballo 2018). To conclude, in the case of these two major infrastructure projects in 
the Philippines, both the funding (loan provision) and the technological expertise, came 
from Japan‟s public (JICA) and private sector. Thus, whether such a public-private 
partnership in development cooperation is excessively benefiting Japanese interests, or 
whether this constitutes as bilateral development cooperation in the literal sense of the 
word, creating a win-win situation for both parties is an excellent question to consider.            
 
 
 
3.3 Peacebuilding in Mindanao 
 
The armed religious and political conflict in Southern Mindanao, between the 
Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), is one of 
the longest lasting in SEA (Peng Er 2008, p. 45). According to estimates of the last four 
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decades, 200,000 lives have been lost in the conflict and 1,500 000 people have become 
internally displaced due to the conflict. In addition, because of the long duration of the 
conflict, economic growth in the Muslim regions of Mindanao has been seriously 
hindered, for instance: the GDP growth of the Autonomous Region in Muslim 
Mindanao (ARMM) was half of the national Philippine average in 2014 (3% vs. 6%) 
(Ochiai 2016, p. 39). The historical origins of this conflict date back several hundred 
years to the arrival of the Spanish colonists on the Philippine islands. While the Spanish 
were able to conquer and Christianize the inhabitants of Luzon and the Visayas 
archipelago to the north in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they were never 
successful in achieving the same in Mindanao, despite waging war against the Moros 
(Muslim natives) for over 300 years (ibid. pp. 38, 39). 
 Despite the fact that, Spain had no de jure control over Mindanao, the island was 
acquired by the US, following Spain‟s defeat in the Spanish – American War of 1898. 
The US military forces defeated the Moro resistance on the island and for the first time, 
Mindanao became officially part of the Philippines. Starting in 1912, the US colonial 
regime started promoting the migration of Christians from Visayas and Luzon, a policy 
which, the later newly independent Republic of the Philippines continued and 
accelerated in 1946. The result of this policy by Manila was the increasing population 
replacement in Mindanao, in favor of the Catholic Christian Filipinos (Peng Er 2008, p. 
49). The modern phase of the conflict ignited in 1968, when 14 Muslim soldiers were 
executed by the Philippine Armed Forces on Corregidor Island in Manila Bay. This 
resulted in a bloody civil conflict between the Catholics and Muslims in Mindanao and 
eventually, as a consequence, the Marcos regime declared martial law in the Philippines 
in 1972 (Ochiai 2016, p. 39). 
 With support and training from Muslim countries, most notably Libya and 
Malaysia, the Moros were able to form organized resistance against the Philippine 
government. Thus in 1971, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was born. At 
its heyday, the MNLF had 65,000 guerrillas in its service, which were able to keep the 
government forces out of Muslim Mindanao. Eventually in 1976, the Marcos regime 
and the MNLF came to a peace agreement mediated by Libya, which granted the Moros 
limited autonomy from the Manila government. This was the beginning for what in 
1989 would become known as the ARMM. However, some members of the MNLF felt 
betrayed by the organization‟s leadership and the limited autonomy granted by Manila. 
Subsequently, the more radical and Islamic MILF was established (Peng Er 2008, p. 
50).   
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It was not until the new millennium that, Japan became actively involved in the 
peace process in Mindanao, although, it has been sending ODA to Mindanao since 1989 
(excluding rebel-controlled regions). Back in 2001, the newly elected President of the 
Philippines Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, decided to take a more conciliating approach to 
the Mindanao issue, in contrast to her predecessor Joseph Estrada. Subsequently, a 
ceasefire with the MILF was established, which was mediated by Malaysia. During a 
bilateral summit meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Japan‟s 
assistance in the peacebuilding effort was promised. This also suited well with the 
zeitgeist of the time as, the poor and disenfranchised Mindanao was seen as a brewing 
pot for radical Islamic terrorism by the US and its allies (Ibid. pp. 51, 52). Before 
Mindanao, Japan had engaged in peacebuilding in Cambodia (1992, 1998), in Timor-
Leste (1999) and in a multitude of locations simultaneously with the involvement in 
Mindanao (Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Iraq) (MOFA 2007, pp. 4-8). 
In the following year of 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi pledged a support 
package for peace and stability in Mindanao, worth $400 million. The support package 
had two stated aims, firstly to help eradicate extreme poverty in the region and 
secondly, to help in the conciliation of the conflict and in preventing further 
radicalization of the local population. From Japan‟s perspective, the support package 
demonstrated further support for the Arroyo administration and increasing engagement 
with the peace process in Mindanao. In addition to monetary support, or as critiques of 
Japan‟s foreign policy would often put it, checkbook diplomacy, the package also 
included training programs and sending policy advisors, in order to train ARMM 
government officials. In fact, eventually 700 officials from the ARMM government 
received training from Japan and the ARMM also received its very own ODA advisor 
from Tokyo (Peng Er 2008, p. 52).     
In 2006, Japan joined the International Monitoring Team (IMT) of the Mindanao 
conflict. It was the only non-Muslim, non-Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 
state to do so, as the other IMT member states were: Libya, Brunei and Malaysia. This 
was a great milestone for Japan‟s foreign policy, as this was an independent move for 
Japan, outside of the frameworks or influences of the UN and the US. The purpose of 
the IMT was to monitor the ceasefire that had been in place since 2003. Originally, 
Japan was invited to join the IMT much earlier by Malaysia in 2004, but since the 
ceasefire was still deemed unstable at that time by Japanese officials, it did not take 
place until two years later. As a member of the IMT, Japan is also cooperating with 
MILF and its own developmental agency the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) 
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with the silent approval of the Government of the Philippines. The former head of the 
JICA Ogata Sadako and a delegation of 15 Japanese officials even made an official visit 
to the MILF controlled territory in 2006, meeting high ranking officials of the 
insurgency. In a subsequent speech delivered by Sadako, she proclaimed that Japan‟s 
peacebuilding effort in Mindanao will be based entirely on the principle of human 
security (ibid. pp. 52, 53). To verify the prominence and importance of peacebuilding in 
Japan‟s ODA, according to Trajano (2013, p. 2), Japan‟s extensive peacebuilding 
project in Mindanao has become one of three main foundations for its overall ODA to 
the Philippines.        
In 2011, an important and historic meeting between President Aquino and MILF 
Chairman Murad Ebrahim took place in Narita, Japan in which, the two sides of the 
conflict discussed the future, and how to move forward towards peaceful reconciliation. 
Furthermore, eventually a basic outline of a peace accord was signed by both parties 
(Ochiai 2016, pp. 40-41). The peace negotiating process, which began in Narita, was 
eventually finalized in 2012 by the Government of the Philippines and the MILF 
signing a peace agreement (BBC News 2012). That being said, Islamic terrorism and 
sectarian violence conducted by terrorist organizations such as Abu Sayyaf continue to 
be serious issues in the Southern Philippines to this day (The Diplomat 2019). 
The latest stage of the conflict resolution concerns the creation of a new 
autonomous region for the Muslim minority in Mindanao, which will replace the current 
ARMM. In July 2018, President Duterte signed the Bangsamoro Organic Law, which 
will establish a new autonomous region for the Moros, namely, the Bangsamoro 
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. This development has come about since, its 
predecessor the ARMM, has been plagued by corruption in governance, 
mismanagement of resources and clan warfare. The second factor behind the new law 
and the establishment of a new constitutional entity is due to the fact that, the Moros 
have not been satisfied with the degree of autonomy under the ARMM (Ver 2018). On 
the domestic front, by signing the new law, President Duterte is advancing his agenda of 
federalizing the Philippines, which conveniently matches with the Moros aspirations of 
greater autonomy (Ochiai 2016, p. 45).  
To recap and conclude, despite the conventional understanding and grouping of 
the categories of ODA and peacebuilding, in Japan‟s foreign policy framework, 
peacebuilding has been integrated as a part of Japan‟s ODA (MOFA 2003, p 4; MOFA 
2015, pp. 1, 6, 8). Japan‟s involvement in the peacebuilding process in Mindanao is one 
of the best and arguably, one of the most successful and prominent instances of the 
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nation‟s commitment to human security and proactive pacifism in its foreign policy. 
One of the highlights of Japan‟s peacebuilding in Mindanao is the fact that, it has been 
an independent endeavor of Japan, excluding US or UN initiative in the matter. 
Secondly, being the only non-Muslim participant nation in the IMT, demonstrated trust 
in Japan as a proactively pacifist nation. It has also demonstrated the Philippine 
government‟s trust on Japan as a neutral mediator, as it has allowed the JICA to 
cooperate with the BDA of the MILF.   
 
Figure 2: The Peace Process and Japan‟s Involvement (timeline). Source:  
https://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/field/2018/c8h0vm0000djw93s-
img/c8h0vm0000djw9b2.jpg (accessed: 14.2.19). 
 
 
3.4 Disaster Risk Reduction and Management 
 
As a developing country afflicted by natural disasters such as; typhoons, volcanic 
eruptions, earthquakes and so on, Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM) is 
a fundamental part of comprehensive development cooperation with the Philippines. 
Secondly, from the point of view of human security, which holistically considers a 
multitude of threats to the security, basic needs and wellbeing of the individual, this is 
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also clearly the case. However, due to the effects of climate change on strengthening 
tropical storm intensity, poverty and lack of resources in the Philippines, it is a very 
challenging task even for a major donor such as Japan to have a major impact on. In 
regards to the 2015 revision of the ODA Charter, references to the mitigation of natural 
disasters and disaster relief occur frequently in the policy paper, which is evident in its 
priority issues chapter (MOFA 2015, pp. 7-8). To be precise, the Charter states that, 
Japan seeks to assist developing states in not only DRRM capacity, but also in post-
disaster recovery measures as well. In addition, such development cooperation with the 
SEA countries is particularly emphasized as a priority field and region (ibid.).  
 In recent years, the Philippines‟ vulnerability to typhoons of increasing intensity 
has become increasingly evident and clear. In 2013 the country was struck by Typhoon 
Yolanda (Haiyan), which is considered the strongest ever to have struck any nation. The 
devastation caused more than 6300 fatalities and according to estimates, 2.3 million 
Filipinos became impoverished as a direct consequence of the havoc. According to a 
WB report on the matter: ―the total damage and loss was estimated at PHP 571.1 
billion (USD 12.9 billion) hampering economic growth by about 0.9 % in 2013, and 
another 0.3 % in 2014 (World Bank). Furthermore, in the philosophy of human 
security, the overlapping of persistent poverty, natural disasters, armed conflict and 
violence among other human insecurities, together amplify their disastrous effects on 
the population, and can even affect the citizens of neighboring nations (United Nations). 
Against this background, Japan‟s ODA with a solid basis on human security in 
combination with an emphasis on DRRM, clearly corresponds to a dire necessity, 
especially when it comes to the Philippines. In addition, as a donor nation also facing 
natural disasters on a regular basis, Japan has accumulated vast knowledge and 
expertise in the field of DRRM and in post-disaster rescue efforts.  
 The efforts to improve the Philippines‟ DRRM capabilities and infrastructure 
through Japan‟s ODA have not solely encompassed governmental agencies since, 
Japanese universities, Local Government Units (LGUs), NGOs and small and medium 
size enterprises have also participated in these efforts. This multilateral participation has 
taken place through the following partnership programs running under the JICA 
umbrella: JICA Partnership Program, Survey for Technology Promotion of Japanese 
Small and Medium Enterprises, and for the NGOs through grant assistance schemes 
(NEDA et al. 2016). The mainline bilateral DRRM ODA has however, been 
implemented in collaboration between the JICA and national governmental agencies, 
LGUs, NGOs and People‟s Organizations in the Philippines (ibid. p. 18).   
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Figure 3. DRRM ODA Implementation Scheme. NEDA et al. 2016. p. 18. Source: 
https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/evaluation/FY2015/pdfs/philippines.pdf  
(accessed: 9.4.19). 
 
As described in the Charter, the DRRM improvement measures include the 
development of both “hard” and “soft” infrastructure in the recipient nations. The 
“hard” infrastructure refers to physical constructions, for instance flood barriers, while 
the “soft” refers to systemic enhancement or training of staff (ibid. p. 17).   
One example of a “hard” infrastructure DRRM project in the Philippines funded 
by Japan‟s grant aid is “The Project for Improvement of the Meteorological Radar 
System”, which was completed in 2014 (ibid. p. 19). In a nutshell, the project strived to 
improve the forecasting of weather on the Philippine islands, especially when it comes 
to locations, movement patterns and landfall projections of tropical cyclones. This 
improvement in the national meteorological capabilities was achieved by constructing 
radar towers in peripheral provinces such as Eastern Samar, Cagayan and Catanduanes. 
Prior to the completion of the project, the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and 
Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) had to rely on satellite images, 
which was considerably more time consuming as, calculations were required to estimate 
the arrival times of weather fronts and tropical cyclones. In addition to the construction 
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of the radar towers and the provision of new equipment, the JICA also established a 
technical cooperation scheme with the goal of providing training for the local PAGASA 
staff by Japanese meteorology experts (ibid. pp. 25-26). Thus, in this case the grant aid 
provided the “hard” infrastructure for this project while, the subsequent technical 
cooperation provide the “soft” infrastructure.  
In addition to the PAGASA, the JICA has been assisting the Philippine Institute 
of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS) on multiple projects around the country. 
One of such projects is one where, PHIVOLCS in collaboration with Japanese scientists 
developed and launched a house structure evaluation tool, in order to improve 
earthquake preparedness of mainly residential houses in the Philippines (JICA 2014b).   
As both the Philippines and Japan face virtually the same threats posed by 
natural forces (tsunami, volcano eruptions, typhoons and earthquakes) on a regular 
basis, bilateral cooperation in DRRM is most certainly a worthwhile venture. As a 
nation with an extensive history of DRRM, both in hard and soft infrastructure sense, it 
is in fact hard to imagine a better development cooperation partner-state other than 
Japan. Consequently, the DRRM is arguably one of the most important fields in 
bilateral development cooperation, as the transfer of technology and know-how enabled 
by it, can literally safe lives and improve the human security of thousands, if not, 
millions of Filipinos. It is also not a one way movement of assistance, as there have 
been manifestations of reciprocity in it, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.1.     
 
 
3.5 Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers 
 
Since its inception in 1965, the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV) 
program has sent over 40,000 Japanese citizens as volunteer workers to developing 
countries around the globe. The volunteer program is managed by the JICA and its 
objectives are the following: provision of technical assistance to developing nations, 
promotion of friendship between Japan and developing countries and finally, to 
internationalize the Japanese youth and the public as a whole. The inspiration for the 
program came from the US Peace Corps, which was established just a few years prior to 
the JOCV. The volunteers, who are between the ages of 20 and 39 years old, are 
selected from a pool of applicants and then, they are trained prior to their two year 
assignment abroad (Okabe et al. 2016, pp. 222, 223).  
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Typical economic and social sectors in which volunteers are placed in the 
destination country include: agriculture, education, forestry and fisheries, sanitation, 
manufacturing and sports, among other fields (JICA, Civil Participation). As the 
Government of Japan perceives the JOCV to be a nationwide participatory element of 
its ODA (Okabe ibid.), it essentially grants the average citizen a chance to participate in 
the nation‟s development cooperation with the developing world, and to make a 
difference in it.   
 Since the memories of Japanese occupation and the immense battles between the 
US‟ and Imperial Japanese forces in the Philippines were still fresh on people‟s minds, 
the JOCV had a very modest initial objective in the country, namely, to build trust and 
rapport with the local community. Possibly the greatest and the most long term impact 
the JOCVs have achieved in the past 50+ years in the Philippines, is in the fields of 
veterinary medicine and animal husbandry. The volunteers have particularly excelled in 
introducing and teaching artificial insemination techniques to local cattle owners and 
farmers. Through working in close cooperation with the Philippine Department of 
Agriculture, the JOCVs played a key role in the widespread adoption of artificial 
insemination in rural areas of the Philippines (JICA 2005, p. 3). Such efforts have 
increased the profitability and the overall quality of the Philippine livestock (JICA 
2014a p. 19)  
 As of 2017, the Philippines was the second largest destination country for JOCV 
volunteers, with the cumulative figure of 1639 volunteers received (Figure 4). The JICA 
has been sending Japanese volunteers to the country for more than 50 years now, since 
1966 to be precise. Since that was just the second year of the JOCV program running, it 
demonstrates the long duration and consistency of Japan-Philippines development 
cooperation and grassroots affinity. The JOCV participants in the Philippines, have 
participated in assisting the development of various economic and social sectors in the 
country, such as in; organic agriculture, community development, design, 
environmental education, disaster relief and prevention, food processing and so on. 
(JICA 2016a). According to the JICA (ibid.), the economic and social sectors open to 
Japanese volunteering shall in the future, broaden up to include tourism, education, care 
and support for the disabled and nutrition.     
 According to Joselito De Vera, the Executive Director of the Philippine National 
Volunteer Service Coordinating Agency (PNVSCA): ―With JOCVs here in the 
Philippines, we are able to provide the necessary technical expertise to Filipino partner 
institutions – both government and non-government and at the same time, promote 
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better socio-cultural understanding between our societies (JICA 2014a, p. 16).‖ As can 
be deducted from the statement above, the JOCV program does not solely facilitate 
cross-cultural understanding and bilateral development cooperation, but also, it supports 
its domestic national equivalent in the Philippines, the PNVSCA.  
 
 In the 2015 Charter revision, the JOCV program is referred to in the following 
way:  
 
―The government will also encourage the participation of its people from all walks of 
life in development cooperation and promote utilization of their expertise in society, 
with a view to expanding those involved in development cooperation, including the 
recruitment of JICA Volunteers. In this regard, the government will provide adequate 
information to the public and listen to the voice of the people at all levels including 
suggestions regarding development cooperation‖ (MOFA 2015, p. 14). 
 
 This verbatim quotation from the Charter demonstrates the grassroots nature of 
the JOCV program. Furthermore, it displays the positive view of the Japanese 
government in regards to citizen participation in the actual implementation of ODA and 
its technical cooperation. In regards to human security as defined by the Government of 
Japan as: “freedom from want” (Lewis-Workman 2018, pp. 91-92; MOFA 2015, p. 4), 
one can observe JOCV assistance in the introduction of advanced artificial insemination 
to the rural Philippines as working towards that goal. In other words, in this context the 
volunteer efforts have managed to enhance the continuity of profitable livestock raising 
in the country and to strengthen the domestic livestock industry as a whole.     
Despite the JOCV program‟s modest size in comparison to other types of ODA 
from Japan to the Philippines, it is an interesting grassroots (people-to-people) 
dimension of the bilateral development cooperation. As created and implemented very 
shortly following the US Peace Corps, it demonstrated a certain strive towards assisting 
the developing world, even when Japan‟s own level of prosperity and development was 
still relatively modest in hindsight. One could argue that, Japan‟s embracement and 
advocacy of human security in its ODA and foreign policy as a whole, is the 
culmination of this desire. Despite the program‟s modest beginnings in the Philippines 
as a grassroots bridge builder between the peoples of the nations, it has gained the 
recognition of the PNVSCA and it has most prominently enhanced the professional 
lives of especially small scale cattle farmers in the rural areas of the country.   
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Figure 4. JICA Volunteers in Philippines (2017). Source: 
https://www.jica.go.jp/philippine/english/activities/c8h0vm0000d3hjya-
att/activity04_04_01.pdf (accessed: 14.2.19). 
 
3.6 The Role of NGOs 
 
Japanese NGOs have not only participated and cooperated with government entities in 
the grassroots implementation of foreign aid policy, but also, some of them have been 
staunch critiques of corrupt and questionable practices of the past. A case in point was 
the ODA embezzlement scandal involving the Marcos regime in the Philippines in 
1986, which spurred the formation of a lobby group called Re-Consider aid, Citizens‟ 
League (REAL) by activists of various Japanese NGOs. REAL was formed as a 
response to the grassroots anger and frustration caused by the massive misuse and 
embezzlement of ODA funds by President Marcos, Marcos‟ family and high officials in 
the Philippine government. The country received huge amounts of aid from Japan under 
the Marcos regime. The total amount being 504 billion yen, which was mostly, 
allocated to large infrastructure projects. The most controversial portion of the monetary 
transfers were the so called commodity loans, which according to some estimates, 
helped to keep the regime in power in precarious times, such as following the 
assassination of opposition candidate Benigno Aquino, Jr. in 1983 (Ohashi et al. 2016, 
p. 328).    
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 The Marcos scandal highlighted structural faults in the management and 
supervision of the ODA program. Consequently, the Japanese parliament established an 
investigative body to look further into the matter in 1986. However, REAL activists 
demanded a complete reform of the system to be implemented including the 
establishment of a special ODA ministry and a law, which would specify the underlying 
ideology of the ODA policy and also, to enable parliamentary involvement in ODA 
policy (ibid. p. 329). In hindsight, even though the demands of the activists were never 
realized, Japan‟s ODA policy did gain a cabinet approved ideological basis in the form 
of the original ODA Charter in 1992. However, neither the original ODA Charter nor its 
revisions are laws per say, but rather policy guidelines (Jain 2016, p. 98).   
When it comes to the state of the Japanese civil society in general, there was a 
great increase in the number of developmental NGOs in the 1980s. Their main expertise 
coveted fields such as; global advocacy, peacebuilding and disaster relief. Some of the 
most prominent development NGOs were: the Japan International Volunteer Center and 
the Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC). JANIC‟s goal was to 
form a network of Japanese development NGOs, which contributed to the increasing 
cooperation between civil society and the Japanese government in the field of 
development cooperation. The NGO advocacy for an ODA reform truly kicked off 
following the 1996 and 1998 meetings between civil society members and the MOFA, 
and the JICA respectively. In terms of the Japanese political system, in the 2000s 
development NGOs have been largely excluded from the ODA policy making process. 
However, they do enjoy close ties with the main opposition party, the Democratic Party 
of Japan (DPJ), due to the fact that, a few founding DPJ members had worked for 
development NGOs in the 1980s (Kim et al. 2017, pp. 130, 149, 150).  
On the domestic grassroots level, Ohno (2013, p. 70) has made a note of how the 
Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011 and its aftermath, enhanced the cooperation 
between businesses, NGOs and local communities. On top of that, as the disaster was 
followed by huge floods in Thailand during the same year, which also negatively 
affected Japanese businesses and commerce, these events served as a reminder to the 
ordinary citizenry and to society as a whole, of the interconnected nature of the 
contemporary globalized world. Thus, one can say that inadvertently, this sequence of 
unfortunate events helped to raise awareness and profile of development cooperation in 
this donor fatigued nation. Furthermore, it helped to raise the profile of NGOs in the 
fields of disaster relief and development cooperation as a whole.    
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 In regards to the 2015 Development Cooperation Charter, the NGOs have raised 
concern, that it strongly represents the interests of the current Abe administration, while 
neglecting any long term strategy. This is the main reason for the advocacy of various 
NGOs since the 1980s of a ground law governing ODA, which would prevent short 
sighted politicization of Japan‟s ODA (Ohashi et al. 2016, p. 341). On the other hand, 
the 2015 ODA Charter recognizes the importance of cooperation with NGOs and the 
civil society in general. What this concretely implies is that, the MOFA and the JICA 
should now be working more closely with NGOs, of both Japanese and foreign origin 
(MOFA 2015, p. 14). On a different strain of thought, such an addition to the policy 
guidelines signifies increasing multilateralism in ODA. On the other hand, the term 
„development cooperation‟ in itself, which appears to be becoming the most preferred, 
already implies an element of multilateralism.   
 Since 1989 a program titled Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security 
Projects (GGP) in the Philippines, administered by the Embassy of Japan in Manila has 
been in operation. Through the program NGOs, LGUs and medical, educational and 
research institutes can organize and receive grants from the Government of Japan for 
small-scale grassroots developmental projects, in order to contribute to the socio-
economic development at a grassroots level (Embassy of Japan to the Philippines [EOJ] 
2017). Since the creation of the program in the Philippines, a total of 525 projects have 
so far been funded and implemented until 2017 (ibid.). In addition, the JICA also 
maintains a so called NGO-JICA Japan Desk in the Philippines. Similarly to the GGP 
framework, the desk supports the collaboration between Japanese universities, NGOs, 
LGUs and their partner institutions in the Philippines (JICA Philippine Office A). In 
addition to the GGP, there are also similar schemes facilitating grassroots cooperation 
within the context of ODA in other fields namely: Technical Cooperation for Grassroots 
Projects (TCGP) and Grant Assistance for Cultural Grassroots Projects (GACGP) (JICA 
Philippine Office B).  
 As has been detailed prior in this section, the relationship between the 
government and its ministries and agencies involved in ODA and the NGOs, has 
sometimes been a contentious one. The advocacy and activism on ODA reform and the 
criticism of abuses of the funds and corruption, together with international criticisms, 
have no doubt had an impact on the development and contents of the ODA Charters. 
The Marcos scandal in 1986 was a major catalyst to NGO activism for ODA reform and 
ODA law, which spurred activism well into the 1990s. In regards to the MOFA and the 
JICA as the main actors in Japan‟s ODA, these governmental organizations appear to be 
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much more collaborative with NGOs, universities and LGUs. This can be considered as 
a major improvement, as in the past, Japan‟s excessive bilateralism in development 
cooperation used to be one of the main points of criticism (Kawai & Takagi 2004, pp. 
268-269). Both the MOFA and the JICA operate several multilateral grassroots level 
projects focusing on human security, culture and technical cooperation.     
 
3.7. Securitization & Strategic Partnership 
 
Since 2013, Japan has been actively diversifying its security ties outside the framework 
of the ubiquitous US-Japan Security Alliance. Two prominent examples of this are the 
growing security ties, cooperation and capacity enhancement with the Philippines and 
Vietnam (Grønning 2018, p. 533). At a first glance, ODA as a sphere of foreign policy 
does not appear to have much overlap with matters concerning regional security and 
geopolitical defense strategy. However, this is not the first instance of Japan‟s strategic 
use of ODA in regards to the Philippines. Already in the late 1980s as a consequence of 
US pressure, Japan pledged substantial contributions to the Multilateral Assistance 
Initiative, which was also known as the mini-Marshall Plan for the Philippines. Since 
the Philippines was a host to prominent US overseas military bases at the time, the tacit 
understanding behind the decision was to allocate support to the US military presence in 
the region without breaking Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (Yanagihara & Emig 
1991, p. 62).   
The securitization of ODA in the contemporary era has undoubtedly been 
influenced by the increasingly assertive China, the rise of its military capability and the 
territorial disputes with it, both in the East China Sea with Japan, and the South China 
Seas with the Philippines respectively. Despite the fact that, virtually all ODA Charter 
revisions to date have explicitly banned the use of Japan‟s development aid for military 
purposes, the 2015 revision creates a loophole for it. To be precise, the Charter states 
the following:  
 
“Japan will avoid any use of development cooperation for military purposes or for 
aggravation of international conflicts. In case the armed forces or members of the 
armed forces in recipient countries are involved in development cooperation for non-
military purposes such as public welfare or disaster-relief purposes, such cases will be 
considered on a case-by-case basis in light of their substantive relevance (MOFA 2015, 
pp. 10-11)”.  
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It should be noted that, in the previous revision of the ODA Charter from 2003, 
such a loophole was missing, while the military use of ODA was explicitly banned in a 
similar manner as in the latest revision (MOFA 2003, p. 5). Outside of the ODA 
framework, a relevant recent policy change has been the fact that Japan is also now able 
to commercially export arms and defense equipment, through the adoption of the three 
principles on the transfer of defense equipment and arms by the Abe administration 
(Trinidad 2017, p. 621). As a consequence of the aforementioned factors, Japan has 
been providing surveillance boats, security equipment and naval training to the 
Philippines and other SEA nations in recent years under the framework of the ODA 
program (Gaens 2015, p. 5).  
Japan‟s main interest in the South China Sea and in the security cooperation 
with the Philippines, is to secure the shipping lanes penetrating the region, on which, it 
is heavily dependent on economically and ultimately, even existentially. For the 
Philippines on the other hand, as a developing nation, it needs all the material and 
monetary assistance it can receive from affluent nations to improve its maritime military 
capabilities and coast guard‟s training and equipment. The modernization of the 
Philippine Navy and coast guard was hastened by the infamous stand off on the 
Scarborough Shoal between the Philippine Navy, Chinese fishermen and coast guard in 
2012. The subsequent diplomatic feud with China did not ease the tension, quite the 
opposite in fact. From a geostrategic point of view, since both countries share a security 
partnership with the US, while at the same time, facing a challenged posed by China, 
this bilateral security cooperation is surely a sound one (De Castro 2017, p. 34, 38). In 
fact during the Scarborough Shoal incident, the former ambassador of Japan to the 
Philippines Toshio Urabe described the state of bilateral relations with the following 
words: ―close-knit triangular relationship among Japan, the Philippines, and their 
closest (mutual) ally—the U.S‖ (ibid. p. 39). Furthermore, despite President Duterte‟s 
rapprochement towards China and even arguably pro-China rhetoric at times, territorial 
and fishing rights clashes are still an ongoing issue on the disputed Scarborough Shoal 
in the South China Sea (Zambrano 2019). 
In addition to the so called „China factor‟, there are also domestic factors and 
political changes that have taken place, which have facilitated the move into security 
cooperation in the bilateral relations. In the case of the Philippines, due to the strong 
role of the President of the Republic in setting the direction of foreign policy, alliances 
and partnerships with foreign nations are dependent upon the personality, opinion and 
experiences of the incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines.  
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Consequently, foreign policy of the Philippines is vulnerable to discontinuities 
and lack of long term strategy. Under the former President Aquino (in office: 2010-
2016), the Philippines pursued a very defensive foreign policy vis-à-vis the territorial 
dispute with China. The Aquino administration took the bold move of taking the dispute 
to the International Court of Justice in Hague, which eventually ruled in favor of the 
Philippines (Trinidad 2017, pp. 616, 617, 631; Panda 2016). Moreover, initially the 
Aquino administration pursued US military assistance, in order to secure the country‟s 
maritime territories against China. However, because of skepticism regarding the 
waning American engagement in Asia, Aquino decided to seek such assistance from 
Japan instead (Trinidad 2017. p. 617). 
Through Prime Ministerial and Presidential joint declarations, the Japan-
Philippines Strategic Partnership, which was signed in 2009, has been evolving towards 
increasing regional security cooperation and capacity enhancement during the last 
decade. It has been a radical change in Japan-Philippines relations since, prior to this 
development, the relations were solely characterized by commercial ties (JPEPA) and 
development cooperation (ODA) in conventional fields (Galang 2019). In March 2016, 
a bilateral treaty on the transfer of defense technology and equipment was signed, which 
made the Philippines the fourth state that has established such a treaty with Japan. 
Consequently, transfers of patrol boats, surveillance aircraft and radar technology have 
been concrete manifestations of this rapprochement in security cooperation 
(Parameswaran 2016; 2017). The provision of aforementioned technology to the 
Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) has been taking place under the JICA scheme titled: 
Maritime Safety Capability Improvement Project (MSCIP) (JICA 2016b).  
According to the JICA, the purpose of the MSCIP is to enhance the maritime 
safety and to be an integral part of nation building and development of the Philippines. 
As an island nation consisting of approximately 7000 islands and islets and 
consequently, with an immense amount of coastline, the capacity building of the PCG is 
of paramount importance for the safety of increasing maritime cargo and passenger 
traffic in the region (ibid.). The aforementioned factors are the official rhetoric for the 
MSCIP, however, the territorial dispute on the Scarborough Shoal and the geopolitical 
China factor as a whole surely plays a tacit part in the MSCIP.  
To conclude, the move in the implementation of Japan‟s ODA to encompass 
security and defense matters during the last decade has been a controversial one, 
considering the traditional stance in the current and past ODA Charters against ODA 
provision towards military use. That being said, in consideration of the fact that, the 
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aforementioned clause in the Charter enables a loophole for such ODA provision in the 
case of public welfare and disaster-relief, the justification can be a matter of framing 
and argumentation, especially in hindsight of the geographical and material realities in 
the Philippines. In consideration of human security, especially regarding the MSCIP, 
the capacity improvement of maritime security surely on its part, enhances the security 
of seaborne individuals and protects their livelihoods as well from overfishing by 
foreign fishing fleets.           
 
 
3.8 Recent Developments with the Duterte Administration 
 
This chapter shall discuss the state and development of bilateral relations between the 
Philippines and Japan, since the inauguration of controversial populist President 
Rodrigo Duterte in June, 2016. In addition, it will mirror these diplomatic and political 
changes with the developmental, security and strategic cooperation between the two 
nations. Despite the fact that this discussion is not directly relevant to this thesis‟ 
primary or secondary research questions, it is still worth discussing as; development 
cooperation between the two countries cannot be analyzed and discussed in isolation 
from general bilateral relations and geopolitical factors. In addition, as stated by Hirata 
(2002, p. 3) unlike in the case of the US for instance, in which ODA is a fairly 
insignificant field of foreign policy, in Japan‟s foreign policy on the other hand, it is one 
of the most important fields. Consequently, it is difficult if not impossible to separate 
ODA from Japan‟s foreign policy, as the former is incorporated so strongly with the 
latter.  
 First of all, it can be said that the election victory of Duterte broke a certain 
trend in the trajectory of Philippine presidential and domestic politics, which has been 
characterized by the dominance of elite families and clans, both in the economic and 
political sectors of the society (De Haar 2011, pp. 127-128). Such powerful interest 
groups have often hindered trade liberalization in the country and consequently, 
economic growth and development as well (ibid.). As the first President of the Republic 
coming from the historically and economically marginalized region of Mindanao, 
Duterte‟s presidency with all its related controversies can be seen as a great watershed 
moment in the domestic politics of the Philippines. The dramatic election victory and 
subsequent presidency has brought serious dark clouds over the continuity of the 
country‟s cooperation and alignment with the US and consequently, this has also put the 
59/86 
future of bilateral relations with Japan into a state of perceived uncertainty. As noted by 
Trinidad (2017), the recent rapprochement in relations that the Philippines has had with 
China, and to a lesser degree with Russia, since Duterte‟s presidency, has put the 
increasing strategic and economic partnership between Japan and the Philippines, which 
was most notably championed by the former President Benigno Aquino III into 
jeopardy. 
 However, whether these fears fueled by the perceived uncertainty vis-à-vis 
relations with Japan, has had any concrete effect is definitely a question worth 
exploring. In previous decades, the Japan-Philippines bilateral relations have been 
dominated by trade and cooperation in the fields of economy and development (ibid. pp. 
630-631). That being said in the 2010s, this bilateral cooperation has become more 
comprehensive, which is partly due to Japan‟s involvement in the peace process in 
Mindanao and secondly, due to the changed geopolitical climate in the region in 
addition to, changes in Japan‟s domestic politics in relation to its pacifist constitution. 
Both of these factors have been discussed in more depth in Chapters 3.3 and 3.7 
respectively. Since both securitization and peacebuilding in Japan‟s foreign policy are 
conceptualized under the umbrella of ODA (MOFA 2015, pp. 1, 6, 7, 11; Gaens 2015, 
pp. 4-5; Ochiai 2016), these factors make Japan‟s ODA arguably the most important 
instrument in contemporary Japan-Philippines relations. Furthermore, as Japan 
continues to be the largest source of ODA funds to the Philippines under the Duterte 
administration, according to the latest annual report by NEDA (2017, p. 13), the case 
for this argument becomes even stronger.     
 In the Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting of 2017 between Prime Minister Abe 
and President Duterte, development cooperation played a key part in the Summit, as the 
yen loan provision for the Phase I of the construction of the MMSP was signed by both 
parties, in addition to, other infrastructure and rebuilding projects, such as the 
reconstruction of the city of Marawi, which was severely damaged due to an armed 
struggle between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Islamic State affiliated 
insurgents. The bilateral signing of exchange notes, which also encompassed the 
provision of a TC-90 Maritime JSDF aircraft and coastal radar equipment as a concrete 
manifestation of defense cooperation, also took place in the Summit (MOFA 2017).          
In contrast to the Aquino administration, the incumbent President Duterte, has 
been taking a more reconciliatory approach towards China, which has raised concern 
regarding bilateral ties with Japan (Trinidad 2017, p. 624; De Castro 2017). In addition, 
due to the personalized nature of the Philippine presidential system and the evident 
60/86 
observation, that the current President harbors resentment towards the US, there is 
uncertainty of how it will ultimately effect the triangular relations between the 
Philippines, the US and Japan (Trinidad 2017, pp. 625, 629). That being said, so far in 
light of the statistical data utilized in this thesis, the newly found reconciliation between 
Manila and Beijing has yet to manifest into anything substantial, in terms of 
development aid and investments. Despite promises of a „golden era‟ in Sino-Philippine 
relations and remarkable investments from China, as of 2017, the largest foreign 
investors to the Philippines were; Japan, Taiwan and Singapore (Heydarian 2018b; 
Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) 2017, p. 7). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: “Distribution of Approved Foreign Investments (FI) by Country of Investor 
Annual 2017” (2017). Source: Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA). Foreign 
Investments Fourth Quarter 2017. p. 7. 
https://psa.gov.ph/sites/default/files/Fourth%20Quarter%202017%20Foreign%20Invest
ments%20Report.pdf (accessed: 26.3.19).  
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Figure 6: “Total ODA by Fund Source in USD Million (2017)”.  
Source: National Economic Development Authority (NEDA). ODA Portfolio Review 
Report 2017, p. 13. https://www.neda.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Official-
Development-Assistant-ODA-As-of-January-7.pdf (accessed: 20.2.19).  
 
 To conclude, despite much concern among many analysts, the Duterte 
presidency does not seem to have caused any change or realignment in the status quo of 
Japan-Philippines relations so far. Such concerns were raised due to Duterte‟s pivot to 
China and apparent break-up with the Philippine traditional alliance with the US. 
However, despite the fact that Japan has a close alliance with the latter, it does not seem 
to have had an effect on Japan‟s relations with the Philippines, according to media and 
foreign ministry publications. On a contrary note, Prime Minister Abe and President 
Duterte seem to have a rather excellent rapport, as demonstrated by the latter‟s 
declaration of a “golden age [for] our Strategic Partnership” (Presidential 
Communications Operations Office 2017). Overall, the bilateral development 
cooperation which encompasses peacebuilding, reconstruction of Marawi, infrastructure 
projects and the capacity enhancement of the Philippine Navy and coast guard, appear 
to be the most prominent factor in the contemporary bilateral relations. 
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3.9 Summary 
 
The year 2014 marked the 50
th
 anniversary of Japan-Philippines development 
cooperation, while 2016 on the other hand, marked the 60
th
 anniversary of JOCV 
activities on the ground in the Philippines (NEDA et al. 2016). Based on the recognition 
of these milestones in the bilateral development cooperation, one can conclude that, the 
cooperation has withstood the test of time and the challenges caused by the radical 
changes in the government and the political system in the Philippines. In other words, 
the cooperation has withstood the Marcos regime, Marshall Law, the corruption 
scandal, the turmoil of democratization and the recent geopolitical uncertainty brought 
about by the recent change of Presidential leadership in Manila.  
 Japan‟s ODA to the Philippines initially emerged as mere war reparations, but it 
developed through the decades into a multifaceted and comprehensive bilateral 
development cooperation scheme. Just as Japan‟s ODA policy as a whole, also 
bilaterally vis-à-vis the Philippines, the program has transformed considerably over the 
decades while its core and ideology still hold many of its original ideas and norms. Just 
as the terminology has begun to shift from ODA to development cooperation, which 
emphasizes donor-recipient reciprocity, so has the Philippines provided humanitarian 
assistance to Japan in a time of crisis (Great East Japan Earthquake). Currently, Japan‟s 
ODA to the Philippines has become increasingly holistic, as it encompasses both 
traditional fields of development cooperation such as; infrastructure development, 
DRRM, grassroots volunteering, and the more unorthodox fields such as; peacebuilding 
and security and defense cooperation.   
  
 
4.0 Frames and Policy Implementation 
 
This chapter of the thesis will utilize frame analysis methodology initially to recognize 
the dominant frames in the founding document of Japan‟s contemporary ODA policy. 
To be precise, the document in question is the Development Cooperation Charter 
released by the MOFA of Japan in 2015 and approved by the Cabinet of Japan. 
Secondly, the chapter will compare the extracted frames and their implications with the 
ODA policy application in the Philippines through, referring to findings from the other 
chapters of this thesis and through research of official documentation and statistics. 
63/86 
Such an analysis is important in regards to the first research question of this thesis, 
which set out to explore, how well do the values, basic policies and goals of the Charter 
align with the actual implementation of Japan‟s ODA in the Philippines. However, prior 
to exploring the framing in the Charter, one must initially analyze and define what the 
values, goals and basic policies of the Charter exactly are.  
 
 
4.1 Values, Goals and Basic Policies 
 
The value base in the Charter can be extracted via a careful analysis of the Charter, 
while taking into consideration the previous discussions and developments in the history 
of Japan‟s ODA, which were discussed in detail in section 2 of this thesis. Moreover, 
the general trends and changes in history and the international system, such as the oil 
crisis and the increasing globalization in contemporary times, have undoubtedly had an 
effect on the value base of the Charter and consequently, on Japan‟s ODA policy as a 
whole. The effect of self-perceived history is evident in the Charter‟s philosophy section 
(MOFA 2015, pp. 2-4) for instance, which justifies Japan‟s involvement in assisting 
developing nations, on the basis of its track record as a successful Asian nation that has 
managed to overcome grave challenges during its modernization, while continuing to do 
so, in regards to its demographic challenges, among other contemporary issues.  
Meanwhile, the philosophy section also makes the case for Japan as a 
responsible actor in international relations, an actor which, promotes and values an 
international system based on international law and universal values. In regards to the 
latter, these are arguably the values of the liberal democratic system, in other words, so 
called western values. Since joining the Colombo Plan in 1954, Japan has been a 
consistent provider of ODA to the developing world for more than 60 years now (ibid. 
p. 3). Based on this recognition and legacy, the Charter asserts that Japan‟s efforts in 
development cooperation are much respected in the international community and, there 
is no indication of reprioritization of Japan‟s ODA in the near future. In reference to the 
aforementioned details, one can conclude that, values such as responsibility and self-
help form the core for Japan‟s ODA‟s value base.  
  In regards to the basic policies in the Charter, which further articulate the 
philosophy behind Japan‟s ODA, there are three in total. The first one essentially frames 
development cooperation with pacifism, in line with the Japanese Constitution‟s Article 
9, albeit without the newest re-interpretations implemented by the Abe administration. 
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In verbatim, the policy is titled with the following words: “Contributing to peace and 
prosperity through cooperation for non-military purposes‖ (ibid. p. 4). The description 
of the policy makes the common appeal to Japan‟s post World War II history as a 
pacifist nation, and to its image as a responsible and peaceful international actor. 
Perhaps most interestingly, in addition to contributing ODA for military purposes of any 
kind, the Charter also forbids the aggravation of international conflicts through its 
ODA. However, as discussed in Chapter 3.7 for instance, as Japan has been assisting the 
Philippine navy and the PCG by donating vessels and radar equipment for instance, in 
some capacity, this can be interpreted as aggravating the territorial dispute between 
China and the Philippines in the South China Sea. Consequently, depending on the 
interpretation of this basic policy, there appears to be some breach of it in Japan‟s 
implementation of ODA to the Philippines.      
 The second basic policy in the Charter is the promotion of human security, 
which is described as the founding principle of Japan‟s ODA policy. As has been 
extensively discussed in this thesis, the Japan-Philippines development cooperation is 
rife with projects and forms of development assistance, which can effortlessly be seen 
as, contributing towards human security in the Philippines. Japan‟s involvement in the 
peacebuilding process in Mindanao, in the reconstruction of the city of Marawi, in 
DRRM efforts and the assistance of JOCVs in boosting the livelihoods of rural Filipino 
cattle owners, are all great clear-cut examples discussed in this thesis. Even the more 
traditional JICA projects, such as the MMSP, have substantial potential in improving 
the human security in Metro Manila, due to its ability upon completion to, curve the 
costs and economic losses caused by traffic congestion in addition to, improving the 
productivity of the workforce and thus, contributing towards the aim of “freedom from 
want”.  
Since human security focuses on the level of the individual and since the basic 
policy mandates that, Japan should especially cater towards vulnerable individuals, such 
as; indigenous peoples and the internally-displaced people through its ODA, this also 
needs to be addressed. In the case of the Philippines, Japan‟s support and training 
provided for the ARMM government in Mindanao, as discussed in Chapter 3.3, can be 
seen by an extension to be working towards this goal. However, it hardly qualifies as 
the grassroots level approach that is necessary for truly embracing human security in 
ODA implementation. On the other hand, the GGP schemes that the JICA has 
established in collaboration with Japanese NGOs in the Philippines do in fact certainly 
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embody the grassroots level approach. The same is certainly through in regards to the 
JOCV program.  
The third basic policy in the Charter is articulated in the following manner: 
“Cooperation aimed at self-reliant development through assistance for self-help 
efforts as well as dialogue and collaboration based on Japan‘s experience and 
expertise (ibid.)‖. In this basic policy, one can notice the convergence of the self-help 
principle and Japan‟s own developmental history in the 20th century. In regards to the 
former, the MMSP, which is undoubtedly the most ambitious and extensive JICA 
funded project in the Philippines, was planned and promoted by DOTR to the JICA 
(DOTR & JICA 2017, p. 3), which is the standard and traditional way of procedure in 
Japan‟s ODA. Furthermore, as the construction contract for the MMSP was granted to a 
consortium of Japanese construction and urban rail transport companies (Caraballo 
2018), it displays a public-private partnership based on Japan‟s development experience 
and know-how. Such a close and convenient collaboration between the public and 
private sector on developmental infrastructure projects is surely controversial, but on the 
other hand, in consideration of Japan‟s track record in infrastructure building, such an 
arrangement can gain some legitimacy. Moreover, from the point of view of the change 
in lexicon and overall narrative over ODA internationally, increasingly focusing 
reciprocal cooperation, such a public-private partnership creates economic benefits for 
both the provider and the recipient nation of ODA.         
 Finally, the goals of Japan‟s ODA as defined by the Charter need to be identified 
and discussed. Although, the Charter does not specifically refer to any particular goals 
per say, the priority issues chapter following the philosophy section, appears to be the 
most goal oriented in its narrative (MOFA 2015, pp. 5-7). It is divided into three parts 
concerning: poverty alleviation through quality growth, universal values and addressing 
global challenges. In regards to quality growth, the goal of Japan‟s ODA is to support 
the kind of growth, which can withstand the challenges of economic crisis, natural 
disasters and which does not lead to widening economic inequality or to the 
unsustainable (unharmonious) use of natural resources.  
 In consideration of the Japanese ODA model and history, which has been 
discussed in detail prior in this thesis, it is fair to claim that when it comes to poverty 
alleviation per say, Japan‟s ODA program is concerned with the long term solutions to 
poverty, instead of short sighted humanitarianism with no long term strategy. In other 
words, focusing on improving basic and key infrastructure is perhaps the most 
important policy to implement in a developing economy, in order to support economic 
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growth, productivity and in order to attract foreign investments. Furthermore, in 
consideration of the MMSP for instance, such an infrastructure project has an immense 
potential not just in the economic sense, but also in improving the quality of daily life 
for the residents and commuters in the extremely congested capital region. 
Consequently, such utilitarian infrastructure projects also contribute to the human 
security of the local residents, in addition to, alleviating air pollution.   
 The universal values in the Charter consist of rule of law, democracy, respect for 
basic human rights and freedom, to name a few as, an exhaustive list is not provided in 
the Charter (MOFA 2015, p. 6). Obviously, these terms are consistent with what are 
commonly known as „western values‟, which are arguably the staple of post-World War 
II Japan‟s public and general diplomacy narrative. In consideration of these universal 
values, it is a straightforward procedure to connect the dots between the values, human 
security and Japan‟s support for peacebuilding in Mindanao. Since the final chapter in 
this section of the Charter concerns global issues and the global commons, the author 
has decided to exclude it from the analysis since; it is not clearly relevant in this context 
of bilateral analysis.   
 Besides, in retrospect of the pre- and post-democratization era in the Philippines 
vis-à-vis Japan‟s ODA to the country, one can clearly see that the embracement and 
implementation of universal values has not always been a consistent feature in Japan-
Philippines development cooperation. A case in point was Japan‟s consistent support to 
the Marcos regime in the 1970s and until 1986 in the Philippines. Already prior to the 
ousting of Ferdinand Marcos and the subsequent ODA embezzlement scandal of 1986, 
ODA provision to the undemocratic regime was already deemed unethical by opposition 
politicians in Japan (Orr 1990, p. 82). Consequently, one can conclude that the 
embracement of universal values has come about through the codification of values, 
goals, ideology and basic policies of Japan‟s ODA, in other words, through the release 
of the ODA Charter and its subsequent revisions since 1992.  
 Overall, the goals and policy projections in the Charter encompass an immense 
range of fields and issues. For instance, in addition to the quintessential fields of Japan‟s 
ODA such as support for infrastructural development, it pledges to assist developing 
countries, either bilaterally or multilaterally, in tackling climate change, organized 
crime, loss of biodiversity and so on. In addition, the Charter pledges to assist 
developing nations in improving women‟s rights, rule of law and the judicial system, 
food and nutrition and in anti-corruption measures, among other fields (MOFA 2015, p. 
6). Furthermore, these aforementioned examples are not exhaustive list of policy goals 
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instead; they barely scratch the surface of the Charter. As a consequence, even as a 
foundational document for a major player in the international donor community, it lacks 
realism and credibility in its scope for development cooperation to be a realistic 
founding document for national ODA policy.   
 Consequently, the author proposes that the true purpose of the Development 
Cooperation Charter and its earlier revisions from recent decades is not to be an 
exhaustive policy document in the true sense of the term instead; it acts as a statement 
of purpose for the international donor community. This assertion helps to explain why, 
despite the consistent lobbying efforts of Japanese developmental NGOs, the country‟s 
ODA policy, still lacks a concrete judicial basis. In addition, as discussed in the history 
section of this thesis, the original ODA Charter of 1992 was composed and released as a 
consequence of strong criticisms towards Japan‟s ODA practices and implementation 
from the international donor community and organizations.          
In regards to the second research question, which dealt with the normative and 
progressive concept of human security, frame analysis can also be used as a 
methodological tool to find correlation and answers to it. In order to find out the 
concrete manifestations of human security in Japan‟s development cooperation with the 
Philippines, one must initially explore, how the concept is framed in the official 
governmental discourse and how that correlates with the grassroots reality on the 
ground. Since the ultimate goal of this thesis is to compare the visions and ideals of a 
policy projection to the reality in the field where the policy is implemented in, 
identifying and analyzing the frames associated with these ideals is critically important. 
By doing so, the researcher is able to identify the associated context of an issue and 
thus, determine the true motivations and aspirations of policymakers behind it.  
When it comes to frame analysis as a research methodology, it can be defined in 
the following way: ―an issue can be viewed from a variety of perspectives and can be 
construed as having implications for multiple values or considerations‖ (der Veen 
2011, p. 29). In other words, when observing matters through an ideology or simply 
through an idea or a specific subject or problem, the view that can be deducted differs 
greatly from that of using another frame of interpretation.    
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4.2 Introduction to Frame Analysis 
 
Generally speaking, development cooperation policies (in other words, aid policies) of 
various donor countries, can be framed in numerous ways, as demonstrated by author 
der Veen‟s work (2011, pp. 77-109). Der Veen‟s research analyzed the aid policies of 
several European donor countries, such as the Netherlands and Norway, by comparing 
the dominance of specific frames through which, aid policy discussion and policy 
making in each country is framed with. He achieved this by analyzing the debates over 
annual aid budgets in the national parliaments of said European countries and by 
consequently, coding them for further synthesis. The frames that der Veen‟s research 
came up with were the following: security, power, wealth, enlightened self-interest, 
reputation, obligation and humanitarianism (ibid. pp. 57). The central claim of the book 
can be summarized as the following; different donor countries have a different frame 
dominating the aid discourse and parliamentary discussions, however, it is by no means 
the only frame in the discourse and it can also change or evolve over time (ibid. p. 5). 
As this thesis and der Veen‟s work both share the same methodology namely, frame 
analysis, the author will create a similar set of frames for the analysis of contemporary 
Japan-Philippines development cooperation.    
 Since this thesis also engages in a field of research called policy assessment, 
some notes need to be made about the field itself, and how it relates to the research at 
hand. Policy assessment, as it is commonly understood, can give policymakers and 
researchers valuable insights into the successes and failures of implemented policies, 
through the application of analytical tools. Consequently, it can also enhance rational 
decision-making at the expense of biased and short sighted policy decisions (Adelle & 
Weiland 2012, p. 26). In essence, the kind of policy assessment that this thesis is 
focusing on, is the kind between the stated aims and the on-the-ground implementation 
of the policy (ibid. p. 30). The aforementioned style of policy assessment fits with both 
research questions of this thesis and thus, it is a valid technique to employ. When used 
in tandem with frame analysis, policy assessment can demonstrate the material realities 
regarding the issue, while frame analysis can reveal the context and the association of 
fields, ideology and ideals in policy decisions. 
 In general, the 2015 Development Cooperation Charter has exceedingly broad 
policy guidelines and rules of conduct. The rules evidently have a basis in national 
ethics or in the values of contemporary Japanese government and society. An example 
of this is the pacifism in the Charter, although a right to help allies in need militarily is 
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reserved to protect national welfare of ODA recipient countries, or in the case of 
disaster relief purposes (MOFA 2015, pp. 10-11). Consequently, from this one can 
synthesize the frame of pacifism (one of the quintessential foundations of modern 
Japan‟s foreign policy) and as a relative newcomer in ODA framework, securitization. 
However, it is worth pointing out that, in the 2003 revision of the ODA Charter, the 
degree of pacifism was absolute, in other words, there was no clause of assisting ODA 
recipient nations militarily, in any shape or form (MOFA 2003, p.5). In addition, the 
importance of Japan‟s own development experience as the first developed nation in Asia 
is also clearly visible in the Charter (MOFA 2015, pp. 3, 4, 10). This frame shall be 
referred to as the Development History Frame (DHF).  
As the naming of the Charter changed from revision II (Development Assistance 
Charter, 2003) to the revision III (Development Cooperation Charter, 2015) it implies 
that, the 2015 Charter is considerably more multilateral and cooperative in comparison 
to its predecessor. The general evolution of terminology regarding ODA in the 
international context is an interesting phenomenon when it comes to frames that can be 
perceived from it. The terms „foreign aid‟, „ODA‟ and „development cooperation‟ all 
carry connotations, which can reveal their framing by the user, policymaker and other 
actors.           
 Generally speaking, the use of the term „development cooperation‟ has become 
increasingly common and politically correct in the modern era, not just in Japan‟s 
official communiqué, but also in that of other major donor countries and international 
organizations. This shift in lexicon globally reflects the change in attitudes towards aid 
among donor countries, which emphasizes a more equal and reciprocal relationship, 
rather than the one-way donor-recipient mentality (Glennie 2011).      
Upon carefully reading through the Charter, one can rather easily get the 
impression that the international system, and consequently the foreign policy of Japan, 
is clearly at a crossroads, at least in regards to its ODA policy. Based on this realization, 
one can synthesize the frame of cooperatism, which clearly indicates a sense of reform 
as, Japan has been criticized in the past of being excessively bilateral (strictly donor-
recipient) in its development cooperation. This includes domestic criticisms of the 
MOFA, as it is the ministry most responsible for Japan‟s ODA policy (Hirata 2002, pp. 
128-153). However, this development has come about rather unsurprisingly, as the 
trajectory in the development of Japan‟s ODA policy has clearly indicated, since the 
2000s, to be of increasing multilateral cooperation, especially when it comes to 
cooperation with Japanese NGOs (ibid.). Furthermore, the 2015 ODA Charter clearly 
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recognizes that the strict donor-recipient model of development cooperation is no longer 
feasible in the modern era, due to globalization and internationalization of NGOs, local 
governments and the private sector (MOFA 2015, p. 1). Consequently, the frame of 
cooperatism is very prominent in the charter and it seemingly redefines the charter, due 
to its title change.  
In regards to the frame of securitization, there is an interesting reference to the 
National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2013 in the Charter (ibid.). Upon investigation of 
the NSS document itself, the increasing strategic use of ODA becomes apparent, as it is 
recognized as a policy area, which has an effect on the national security of Japan (Prime 
Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2013, pp. 2, 30-32). In the case of the Philippines, the 
securitization and strategic uses of ODA are both clearly identifiable in both Japan‟s 
ODA policy implementation and in the bilateral relations in general. This security 
cooperation dates back to 2013, when Filipino and Japanese diplomats and marine 
officers held a meeting in Manila to discuss mutual cooperation in the South China Sea. 
During the same year, Japan made the donation of 10 patrol vessels via its ODA 
program to the PCG, which demonstrated the rapprochement between the former 
enemies of World War II (Trajano 2013; Zhang et al. 2017, p. 72). 
The most prominent factor behind the securitization of ODA and bilateral ties 
with the Philippines obviously, derives from the territorial disputes and the increasing 
aggressiveness and assertiveness of China‟s maritime expansionism in the East- and 
South China Seas. At the same time however, there are also more existential security 
reasons for the increasing security cooperation in the South China Sea with the 
Philippines and other ASEAN allies. As a consequence of the importance of the Luzon 
Strait (situated north of the Philippine main island), to the oil and gas imports to Japan, 
it is of paramount importance to secure the safe passage of vessels through the strait and 
consequently, to keep geopolitical tension and threats like piracy off the region. 
Enhancing the security capabilities of ASEAN and South China Sea nations, 
prominently Vietnam and the Philippines, is a logical step in this trajectory.  
Due to the prominence and importance of human security, poverty eradication, 
peacekeeping and disaster relief in the Charter (MOFA 2015, pp. 4, 5, 13), the frame of 
humanitarianism can be extracted from its text. Ever since the original ODA Charter of 
1992, Japanese ODA has started to incorporate more humanitarian forms of aid, which 
can also be described as “software aid”. Fujisaki (et al. 1997 p. 519) have discussed this 
shift in Japan‟s ODA policy in detail and they define software aid as the following: 
“assistance for human resource development and institutional building in economic and 
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social development”. As has been discussed in earlier sections of this thesis, Japan‟s 
ODA prior to the 1990s and the subsequent release of the original Charter, was heavily 
dominated by what can be described in this context as „hardware aid‟, in other words, 
large material infrastructure projects. Consequently, whether this is the case in the 
context of contemporary ODA to the Philippines will be discussed in the following 
chapter.   
 
     
4.3 Analysis 
 
As the initial frame that has been extracted, a discussion of pacifism in regards to the 
Japan-Philippines development cooperation shall now commence. The Government of 
Japan follows a philosophy called proactive pacifism, which the Ministry of Defense 
defines as: “proactive contribution to peace based on the principle of international 
cooperation”. Besides, this same definition is also reiterated in the Charter as well 
(Weston 2014, p. 169; MOFA 2015, p.1). The 2015 ODA Charter recognizes that peace, 
security and stability are prerequisites for development and nation-building (MOFA 
2015, p. 6). Likewise, it promises for Japan to provide seamless assistance for both 
peacebuilding and post-conflict assistance, encompassing fields such as; conflict 
prevention, humanitarian assistance for refugees and internationally displaced people, 
reconstruction of social and human capital and the restoration of governance functions 
(ibid.). The aforementioned fields do not constitute an exhaustive list of the fields in the 
Charter‟s pledge towards “realizing a peaceful and secure society”, (ibid.) however, 
already these fields scope Japan‟s peacebuilding and post-conflict efforts far and wide, 
which is a common theme in the Charter and it makes Japan‟s ODA policy projection 
seem considerably ambitious, or even excessively so.  
As discussed in Chapter 3.3, Japan‟s peacebuilding efforts have largely 
concentrated on the high profile level of cooperation and on supporting negotiations 
with the Government of the Philippines, the ARMM and lastly, with the MILF. Since 
human security focuses on the level of the individual in contrast to the societal and other 
collective levels of security, there is some theoretical inconsistency with the 
aforementioned approach. Moreover, when considering the incredibly broad policy 
projections in the Charter on which, Japan‟s peacebuilding and ODA as a whole should 
be based on, it is very challenging and perhaps even unfeasible to assess and compare 
all the minor sub-policy projections of the Charter. Consequently, the conclusion 
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presented earlier in the thesis, which speculated that the Charter is more of a normative 
and ideological document, rather than one to be assessed literally, fits the context here 
also.      
One of the best illustrations of Japan‟s cooperation and contribution to peace 
internationally, through its ODA, is no doubt its involvement in the Mindanao peace 
process in the Philippines. As discussed in detail in Chapter 3.3, Japan has took part in 
the IMT, provided training and assistance to the ARMM government officials, sent 
ODA and JICA personnel to the minority region, and acted as a host in the peace 
negotiations between the MILF and the Government of the Philippines. As the Charter 
also emphasizes post-conflict support, it is difficult to assess the success of Japan‟s 
efforts regarding it as, there does not appear to be a clear consensus on whether it is 
over and settled or not. Consequently, in this regard it is not possible to assess the 
matter besides, the historical main opponents, which are the Government of the 
Philippines and the MILF, have finalized peace negotiations successfully very recently 
in 2018 and thus, it is too early to make conclusions regarding Japan‟s peacebuilding 
efforts on the matter. In addition, since there are additional entities opposing the 
Philippine government such as the Abu Sayyaf terror group and groups affiliated with 
the Islamic State, the endgame for the conflict has become increasing muddled. 
 Based on the scope and primary source data utilized in this thesis, there appears 
to be a clear lack of grassroots assistance on the part of the JICA, which as mentioned 
earlier, does not quite align with the ideals of human security. On the other hand, it does 
align with proactive pacifism while lacking in the grassroots level of the individual. 
Nevertheless, Japan‟s support for the peace process has been remarkable in the sense 
that, it has taken place outside of the US-Japan security alliance and the UN 
peacekeeping framework.  
In regards to the DHF, finding a straight correlation in Japan-Philippines 
development cooperation implementation is not that straightforward. As discussed in 
Chapter 2.1 of this thesis, Japan‟s ODA model, which emphasizes loan aid instead of 
grant aid, mirrors Japan‟s own experience as a developing nation, as the country utilized 
WB loans to improve its key intercity and urban infrastructure, which was followed by a 
timely payback of said loans enabled by the rapid economic growth. The Sino-Japanese 
development cooperation trajectory has followed a very similar path with equal 
economic growth conditions, infrastructure improvements and loan repayments (Drifte 
2008). However, in regards to the SEA ODA recipient nations such as the Philippines, it 
is difficult to make a similar conclusion at this stage, as their development level is still 
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far below that of China, which is now widely considered a middle income country, 
rather than a still developing one. Consequently, one must utilize the data and 
conditions present currently in the Japan-Philippines development cooperation in order 
to make any conclusions using this frame.  
That being said, in many ways the development trajectory of the Philippines 
follows a similar path in comparison to the recently concluded Sino-Japanese 
development cooperation. In other words, in exclusion of peacebuilding, volunteerism 
and other humanitarian and software aid efforts, infrastructure is a very prominent form 
of bilateral development cooperation. Since geographically the Philippines consists of 
more than 7000 islands, which has both historically and contemporarily hampered 
economic growth and development of the nation, the development of basic 
infrastructure is of utmost importance. This issue is further compounded by the large 
population, its growth trajectory and the nation‟s critical vulnerability to various natural 
disasters. 
Despite all the enormous challenges caused by geographic, environmental, fiscal 
and economic factors, since 2010, the Philippine economy has been growing at an 
impressive speed of approximately 6% annually, which has put it in the same growth 
league as India and China among the Asian economies. Moreover, the Philippine 
economy came out largely unaffected by the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998, as well 
as the global financial crisis of 2008. In addition, the Philippines has emerged in recent 
years as a major hub for the BPO of services, in strong competition with India for the 
regional, if not the global leading spot in the industry (Clarete et al. 2018. pp. 2, 3, 6).    
Consequently, since 1969 the JICA has been consistently providing ODA loans 
and technical assistance for the improvement of intercity and interisland road networks, 
in addition to the national energy grid, renewable energy production and so on (JICA 
2014, pp. 68-76). Thus, as discussed in the earlier chapters of this thesis, the Philippines 
as guided through its development cooperation with Japan, is following a similar 
strategy of improving key infrastructure in order to facilitate economic growth and 
increased prosperity in the Philippine archipelago. However, whether the Government 
of the Philippines can assert similar fiscal responsibility as Japan did in relation to its 
WB loans in the 1960s, is another matter entirely, but nevertheless, an integral part of 
the Japanese development history and thus the frame also. Furthermore, since the per 
capita baseline income and level of development are hardly the same in the 
development trajectories of these two nations, it would not be an entirely fair 
comparison.         
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To recap, the frame of humanitarianism in relation to the Charter and the Japan-
Philippines development cooperation, most prominently, encompasses the following 
fields and ideas: human security, poverty eradication, peacekeeping and disaster relief. 
Due to the prominence, ideological and philosophical basis that human security plays in 
the Charter and in the contemporary foreign policy of Japan in general, it is best to start 
the analysis with that concept. Firstly, in the Charter‟s basic policies, the promotion of 
human security is displayed very prominently and it is described in the following way:  
 
“Human security - a concept that pursues the right of individuals to live happily and in 
dignity, free from fear and want, through their protection and empowerment - is the 
guiding principle that lies at the foundation of Japan's development cooperation. Japan 
will thus focus its development cooperation on individuals - especially those liable to be 
vulnerable such as children, women, persons with disabilities, the elderly, refugees and 
internally-displaced persons, ethnic minorities, and indigenous peoples - and provide 
cooperation for their protection and empowerment so as to realize human security. 
(MOFA 2015, p. 4)” 
 
As a consequence of the basic policy as stated above, human security as a 
theoretical concept encompasses fields such as poverty reduction and disaster relief, due 
to its broadly sweeping scale and definitions that can be broadly interpreted. Thus, in 
order to simplify the analysis and correspondence of the policy projection with the 
policy implementation, the author will use the concept synonymously with the concept 
of humanitarianism.  
When considering the 2017 statistics of ODA transfers to the Philippines, the 
proportion of loans for infrastructure development from all donor countries and 
organizations amounted to more than half of the entire annual portfolio (52%, 6.42 
billion USD) (NEDA 2017, p. 1). Meanwhile, 42% of the total loans portfolio came 
from the JICA (5.17 billion USD) Moreover, the majority of JICA loan provisions listed 
in the report are related to various flagship infrastructure projects such as: the MMSP 
(Phase 1), agrarian infrastructure, expressway, mass-transit capacity enhancement and 
the New Bohol Airport construction project, among other examples (ibid. pp. 40, 45, 
59). Consequently, these findings indicate the dominance of hardware aid instead of 
software aid in bilateral development cooperation with the Philippines. These findings 
demonstrate that, the degree of a fundamental transformation in Japan‟s ODA policy, so 
as framed in the Charter, does not quite match its implementation in the Philippines. 
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However, due to the broad definition of human security and its implications, it is 
ultimately a matter of argumentation whether this ultimately is the case or not.     
Meanwhile, the frame of securitization is a covert one as it is not explicitly 
stated in the Charter, but rather, a possibility for it is left open. Moreover, as there is 
growing data indicating that securitization in regards to ODA to the Philippines is 
indeed occurring (Grønning 2018, pp. 538, 544; De Castro 2017, p. 40; Trinidad 2017, 
p. 614; Gaens 2015, p. 5); such a frame can be extracted from the Charter and used in 
analysis. As discussed earlier in this chapter and in chapters 3.7 and 3.8, Japan‟s 
provision of coastal radar, patrol vessels to the PCG and navy provide evidence for the 
concrete application of securitization in Japan-Philippines development cooperation. On 
the other hand, as securitization, especially through the ODA framework clashes with 
the Charter‟s initial pacifistic basic policy and consequently, this makes securitization 
the most controversial frame in this analysis.      
 In regards to the frame of cooperatism as discussed in Chapter 3.4, in the field of 
DRRM, the degree of multilateral cooperation in Japan‟s ODA to the Philippines is 
arguably the highest. Both the mainline and the special cooperative programs of the 
JICA collaborate in the field with the following organizations, both of Japanese and of 
Filipino origin: LGUs, NGOs, universities, People‟s Organizations and private 
companies. In comparison to the traditional model of Japan‟s ODA, which operated and 
conducted projects bilaterally with recipient government departments while shunning a 
multilateral approach; this is a significant and noteworthy change. However, in regards 
to infrastructure projects, such as the MMSP, the traditional bilateral collaboration 
model still persists.   
 
4.4 Summary 
 
In order to provide answers to the initial research question, this analytical chapter of the 
thesis has taken a look at the basic policies, goals and values of the ODA Charter, and 
found alignments and misalignments between them and the ODA policy 
implementation in the Philippines. In regards to the basic policies, this chapter has 
identified the following: ―contributing to peace and prosperity through cooperation for 
non-military purposes‖ (MOFA 2015, p. 4), promotion of human security, and a final 
policy, which can be described as the fusion of the DHF and the self-help philosophy. In 
regards to the former basic policy, it has been identified to be in conflict with the 
relatively recent form of development cooperation with the Philippines, in other words, 
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with the securitization and defense cooperation. In regards to the frames identified in the 
Charter, the same notion manifests as a dichotomy between the frame of pacifism and 
that of securitization. The former is based on the philosophy of proactive pacifism, 
which together with human security, are the foundations of Japan‟s contemporary ODA 
policy. Meanwhile, securitization on the other hand, is not officially recognized in the 
Charter while it is nevertheless taking place bilaterally between Japan and the 
Philippines. While not concretely stated in the Charter, the securitization of Japan‟s 
ODA is mentioned in the NSS document. In addition, the concrete manifestations of 
securitization can also be considered violating the Charter in the sense that, they can be 
interpreted as aggravating the territorial dispute between the Philippines and China on 
the South China Sea.  
 When it comes to the frames of pacifism and human security, Japan‟s 
peacebuilding efforts in Mindanao have been identified, as having more alignment with 
(proactive) pacifism, rather than with human security. This conclusion is based on the 
fact that, the former‟s level of operation correlates more with Japan‟s de facto 
involvement in the peace process, rather than with the grassroots individual security 
level of human security. Alternatively, human security and the grassroots level approach 
do manifest prominently in other fields of Japan‟s ODA implementation in the 
Philippines (DRRM, JOCV activities, rebuilding of Marawi and so on), although the 
public-private partnership and bilateral approach in infrastructure development is still 
the mainstay of Japan‟s ODA implementation. However, due to the broad definition of 
human security, even hardware aid such as infrastructure, can be interpreted as 
promoting it.         
  In regards to the DHF, the Japan-Philippines development cooperation and the 
development of the Philippines as a whole, is essentially following a similar trajectory 
as those from recent and more distant history, namely, the development trajectories of 
Japan and China. Then again, as the frame also implies fiscal responsibility, that 
remains to be seen, as it relies on the current growth trajectory continuing into the 
future. Currently, the utilization of concessional loans from Japan and other ODA 
providers for the improvement of basic and fundamentally necessary infrastructure is a 
sound national economic development strategy by any measure.  
 The frame of cooperatism has brought about a paradigm shift in Japan‟s ODA 
policy, which is a global phenomenon among donor nations. In contrast to the past, 
MOFA and JICA have embraced cooperatism in both ODA policy and its 
implementation, at least to a certain degree. In the context of the Philippines, this 
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paradigm shift has been most notable in DRRM efforts and in general collaboration 
with NGOs. On the other hand, infrastructure projects are still managed on a donor-
recipient governmental basis. In regards to the value base of the Charter, it can be 
defined as a combination of universal values, self-help and responsibility, while the 
introduction of the former is a relatively recent phenomenon, as demonstrated by 
Japan‟s conduct of ODA to the Philippines in the 1970s and 1980s. In consideration of 
the weak state of infrastructure in the Philippines and the Duterte administration‟s 
ambitions infrastructure building program, which has been long overdue for decades, 
the embracement of self-help and responsibility on the ODA recipient side seems to be 
occurring.  
   
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Over the past 60 years, Japan‟s ODA program has developed from war reparations into 
a comprehensive development cooperation scheme encompassing unorthodox fields, 
such as; peacebuilding and securitization. Through the decades it has gone through 
several distinct phases, which have been influenced by changes in the international 
system, outside pressure and the US-Japan Security Alliance, among other factors. The 
most noteworthy change to Japan‟s ODA policy took place through the release of the 
first ODA Charter in 1992, which laid down the ideological foundations for the policy. 
The subsequent revisions of the ODA Charter in 2003 and 2015 have taken the policy 
towards a more radical direction, through adopting human security as the guiding 
principle of Japan‟s ODA. Furthermore, the most recent revision of the Charter from 
2015, which was renamed as the Development Cooperation Charter, also emphasizes 
multilateral cooperation and reciprocity in ODA policy. Despite these seemingly radical 
changes, the underlying core values and the mainstay of Japan‟s ODA, which is large 
scale infrastructure construction projects, have largely remained intact.   
        The Philippines has been a recipient of Japan‟s ODA since its inception and 
contemporarily, the bilateral development cooperation encompasses a wide range of 
different fields, including: DRRM, peacebuilding, infrastructure improvement and 
capacity enhancement for the PCG and navy. The overall bilateral relations have 
become increasingly multifaceted due to the implementation of JPEPA, increasing 
bilateral movement of labor and the strategic partnership between Japan and the 
Philippines. Through utilizing policy and frame analysis, this thesis has made the 
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conclusion that, Japan‟s peacebuilding efforts regarding the Mindanao conflict have 
been more aligned with proactive pacifism, rather than with human security. However, 
other fields related to Japan‟s ODA implementation in the Philippines, namely; DRRM 
and the discussed JOCV activities have been positively identified as contributing 
towards human security. On the other hand, the securitization of ODA has been noted to 
be in conflict with the initial basic policy in the Charter, as well as, with its pacifistic 
framing. Furthermore, the values in the Charter have become increasingly aligned with 
the ODA implementation firstly, due to the codification of the values of the ODA 
program into the ODA Charters and secondly, due to a new emphasis by the recipient 
government. Meanwhile, cooperatism is identified having the most prominent 
manifestations in DRRM and in collaboration with NGOs, while being the weakest in 
infrastructure projects.        
 Finally, the thesis has identified issues with the Charter‟s policy projections as 
well, which originate from the documents extremely broad guidelines, goals and 
ambitions. The author has asserted that, in order to appear more realistic and credible as 
a foundational document for ODA policy, it ought to be simplified to a considerable 
degree. The fact that the Charter remains to lack a judicial basis further supports the 
author‟s conclusion. In addition, due to the broadly interpretable definitions for human 
security provided not just by the MOFA, but also by the UN, for the purposes of policy 
analysis, it can be either convenient or inconvenient for the researcher.      
 
 
6. Bibliography 
 
Adelle Camille & Weiland Sabine. 2012. Policy Assessment: the State of the 
Art. Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal Vol. 30, No. 1, March 2012, 25–33. 
 
Advincula-Lopez V. Leslie. 2005. OFW Remittances, Community, Social and Personal 
Services and the Growth of Social Capital. Philippine Sociological Review, Vol. 53, pp. 
58-74. 
 
Airport Technology: “Bohol-Panglao International Airport, Panglao Island, Bohol 
Province”. https://www.airport-technology.com/projects/new-bohol-airport-panglao-
island-bohol-province/ (accessed: 16.4.19).  
 
Alesina Alberto & Dollar David. 2000. Who gives foreign aid to whom and why? 
Journal of Economic Growth 5(1): 33-63. 
 
79/86 
Arase David. 2005. Japan‟s Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions.                                     
Routledge. 
 
Asplund André. 2015. Values vs. Interest: Strategic use of Japanese Foreign Aid in 
Southeast Asia. Stockholm School of Economics, EIJS.  
 
BBC News: “Philippines and Muslim rebels agree peace deal”. 2012.  
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19860907 (accessed: 30.1.19). 
 
Berger U. Thomas, Mochizuki M. Mike et al. 2007. Japan in International Politics – The 
Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.  
 
Caraballo U. Mayvelin: “Japanese consortium bags subway contract”. 2018. The Manila 
Times. https://www.manilatimes.net/japanese-consortium-bags-subway-
contract/471417/ (accessed: 17.4.19). 
 
Corpuz G. Arturo, Clarete L. Ramon et al. 2018. The Philippine Economy: No Longer  
the East Asian Exception?  ISEAS Publishing.  
 
De Castro Cruz Renato. 2017. 21st Century Japan–Philippines Strategic 
Partnership: Constraining China's Expansion in the South China Sea. Asian Affairs: An  
American Review, 44:31–51. 
 
De Haar Van Edwin. 2011. Philippine Trade Policy and the Japan-Philippines 
Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA). Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of 
International and Strategic Affairs, Volume 33, Number 1, April 2011, pp. 113-139. 
 
Department of Transportation of the Republic of the Philippines (DOTR) & Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA). 2017. Metro Manila Subway Project 
(MMSP): Phase 1. Environmental Impact Assessment – Executive Summary.   
 
Drifte Reinhard. 2008. The End of Japan‟s ODA Yen Loan Programme to China in  
2008 and its Repercussions. Japan Aktuell 2008, (1), 3-15. 
 
Embassy of Japan to the Philippines (EOJ): “Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human  
Security Projects (GGP)”. 2017.   
https://www.ph.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/00_000032.html (accessed: 4.4.19). 
 
Embassy of Japan to the Philippines (EOJ): “Japan-funded New Bohol Airport  
inaugurated”. 2018. https://www.ph.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/00_000713.html  
(accessed: 16.4.19).   
 
Fujisaki Tomoko, Briscoe Forrest et al. 1997. Japan as Top Donor: The Challenge of 
Implementing Software Aid Policy. Pacific Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 4 (Winter, 1996-1997), 
pp. 519-539. 
 
80/86 
Gaens Bart. 2015. Securitizing Aid – The Nexus Between Japan‟s Development  
Cooperation and Security Policy. FIIA Briefing Paper 174. 
https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/securitizing-aid?read (accessed: 3.2.19). 
 
Galang A. Mico: “A Decade of Philippines-Japan Strategic Partnership”. 2019. The 
Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/a-decade-of-philippines-japan-strategic 
partnership/ (accessed: 29.4.19).  
 
Gatpolintan Leslie: “NEDA Board approves Metro Manila Subway, four other 
projects”. 2017. Philippine News Agency. http://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1009398 
(accessed: 30.10.18). 
 
Glennie Jonathan: “Development co-operation: aid by any other name”. 2011. The  
Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty- 
matters/2011/jul/27/aid-and-development-coordination (accessed: 18.3.19). 
 
GMA News: “PHL, Japan sign ¥4.37-B supplemental loan for New Bohol Airport 
expansion”. 2018. https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/money/economy/670447/phl-
japan-sign-yen-4-37-b-supplemental-loan-pack-for-new-bohol-airport-expansion/story/ 
(accessed: 17.4.19).  
 
Go A. Grace Miriam: “Japan to accept 50,000 workers from PH under new hiring  
Rules”. 2018. Rappler.  
https://www.rappler.com/nation/214730-japan-new-hiring-rules-to-accept-more-than  
50-000-workers-from-philippines (accessed: 6.2.19). 
 
Grønning Bjørn Elias Mikalsen. 2018. Japan‟s Security Cooperation with the 
Philippines and Vietnam. The Pacific Review, 31-4, 533-552. 
 
Heydarian Javad Richard: “Under Duterte, Philippines Enjoying An Investment Boom, 
But Don't Thank China”. 2018b. 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardheydarian/2018/03/25/under-duterte-philippines-
enjoying-an-investment-boom-but-dont-thank-china/ (accessed: 6.3.19). 
 
Heydarian Javad Richard: “Duterte's Ambitious 'Build, Build, Build' Project To  
Transform The Philippines Could Become His Legacy”. 2018a.   
https://www.forbes.com/sites/outofasia/2018/02/28/dutertes-ambitious-build-build- 
build-project-to-transform-the-philippines-could-become-his-legacy/ (accessed:  
19.4.19). 
 
Hirata Keiko. 2002. Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Role of NGOs in Tokyo‟s Aid 
Development Policy. Palgrave MacMillan.   
 
Hugh Patrick. 2008. The Transformative Role of Japan‟s Official Development 
Assistance: An Economic Partnership with Southeast Asia.  
 
81/86 
Jain Purnendra. 2016. Japan‟s foreign aid: old and new contests. The Pacific Review, 
2016 Vol. 29, No. 1, 93-113. 
 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA): “JICA's support to lasting peace and  
development in Mindanao”. 2018.  
https://www.jica.go.jp/philippine/english/office/topics/news/180322.html (accessed:  
20.1.19). 
 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA): “Civil Participation”.  
https://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/types_of_assistance/citizen/volunteers.html 
(accessed: 16.1.19). 
 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA): “JICA launches ODA map for Metro  
Manila marking new projects in transport infrastructure”. 2019.   
https://www.jica.go.jp/philippine/english/office/topics/news/190128.html (accessed:  
15.2.19).  
 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA): “Over 150 stakeholders, JICA 
commemorate 50 years of Japanese volunteers in PH”. 2016a.  
https://www.jica.go.jp/philippine/english/office/topics/news/160223.html (accessed: 
19.2.19).   
 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). 2000. Mactan (Cebu) International 
Airport Development Project. 
https://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/evaluation/oda_loan/post/2000/pdf/02s-15.pdf 
(accessed: 17.4.19).  
 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). 2005. Japan Overseas Cooperation 
Volunteers – 40 Years of Grassroots Cooperation. 
https://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/types_of_assistance/citizen/c8h0vm0000anznd
5-att/jocv40years_e_01.pdf (accessed: 25.2.19). 
 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). 2012. The Great East Japan Earth 
quake Assistance from Around the World.  
https://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/j-world/pdf/special01_2-8.pdf (accessed: 
5.3.19). 
 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA): “Signing of Japanese ODA Loan 
Agreement with the Republic of the Philippines: Further strengthening the maritime 
safety capability of the Philippine Coast Guard”. 2016b. 
https://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/press/2016/161026_01.html (accessed: 5.5.19). 
 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). 2017A. ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENT (EIS) FOR METRO MANILA SUBWAY PROJECT 
(MMSP)(Phase1).https://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/social_environmental/id/asia
82/86 
/southeast/philippines/c8h0vm00009pabyg-att/c8h0vm0000boxc4z.pdf (accessed: 
20.3.19). 
 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). 2017. Annual Report 2017  
(Philippines). https://www.jica.go.jp/philippine/english/office/others/c8h0vm0000d3hsd 
w-att/report_2017.pdf (accessed: 28.3.19).  
 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). 2014a. 60 Years of Japan-Philippines  
Cooperation (Commemorative Magazine). 
https://www.jica.go.jp/philippine/english/office/topics/c8h0vm00008t460t- 
att/oda60anniversary_01.pdf (accessed: 1.4.19).  
 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA): “JICA, PHIVOLCS launch earthquake 
safety tool for houses in PH”. 2014b. 
https://www.jica.go.jp/philippine/english/office/topics/news/140218.html (accessed: 
15.4.19). 
 
JICA Philippine Office A: “About NGO-JICA Japan Desk in the Philippines”.  
https://www.jica.go.jp/philippine/english/office/about/ngo_desk_01.html (accessed:  
4.4.19). 
 
JICA Philippine Office B: “Assistance Schemes for NGOs”.  
https://www.jica.go.jp/philippine/english/office/about/ngo_desk_02.html (accessed:  
4.4.19). 
 
Kato Hiroshi, Okabe Yasunobu, Ohashi Masaaki et al. 2016. Japan‟s Development  
Assistance : Foreign Aid and the Post-2015 Agenda. Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Kawai Masahiro & Takagi Shinji. 2004. Japan‟s Official Development Assistance:  
Recent Issues and Future Directions. Journal of International Development. J. Int. Dev. 
16, 255–280 (2004). 
 
Kim Taekyoon, Hyuk-Sang Sohn, Bok Cheol Jeong. 2017. At the Nexus of Advocacy  
and Accountability: New Challenges and Strategies for Japanese Development NGOs, 
Pacific Focus, Vol. XXXII, No. 1 (April 2017), 129–153.  
 
Kitaoka Shinichi. 2016. Sustainable Development Goals and Japan‟s Official  
Development Assistance Policy: Human Security, National Interest, and a More  
Proactive Contribution to Peace. Asia-Pacific Review, 2016 Vol. 23, No. 1, 32–41.  
 
Kurusu Kaoru & Kersten Rikki. 2011. Japan as an Active Agent for Global Norms: The  
Political Dynamism Behind the Acceptance and Promotion of “Human Security”. Asia  
Pacific Review, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2011.  
Lewis-Workman Steven. 2018. International Norms and Japanese Foreign Aid. Asian 
Perspective 42 (2018), 85–120.  
 
83/86 
Manila Standard: “Japan needs 50k Philippine workers starting 2019”. 2018.  
http://manilastandard.net/news/national/278516/japan-needs-50k-philippine-workers-
starting-2019.html (accessed: 7.3.19). 
 
Martial Law Museum: “It Takes a Village to Loot a Nation: Cronyism and Corruption”.  
https://martiallawmuseum.ph/magaral/the-philippines-during-the-martial-law/  
(accessed: 14.2.19).  
 
Miller R. Andrew, Dolsak Nives. 2007. Issue Linkages in International 
Environmental Policy: The International Whaling Commission and Japanese 
Development Aid. Global Environmental Politics. 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA). 2015. Development Cooperation 
Charter. https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000067701.pdf. (accessed: 30.10.2018). 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA). 2014. Japan‟s Official Development 
Assistance White Paper 2014: Chapter 1 The Track Record of Japan‟s ODA. 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA):”Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting”.  
2017. https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sea2/ph/page3e_000784.html (accessed: 26.3.19).  
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA). 2006. The Signing of the Japan- 
Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA).  
https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2006/9/0908.html. (accessed: 9.11.18). 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA). 2003. Japan‟s Official Development 
Assistance Charter. https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/revision0308.pdf 
(accessed: 6.1.19). 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA). 2007. Japan‟s Efforts on Peacebuilding –  
Towards Consolidation of Peace and Nation-building.  
https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/effort0704.pdf (accessed: 23.1.19). 
 
Mitsuya Araki. 2007. Japan‟s Official Development Assistance: The Japan ODA Model 
That Began Life in Southeast Asia. Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2007.  
 
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) et al. 2016. Joint Evaluation  
of Japan‟s Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the Disaster Risk Reduction and  
Management (DRRM) Sector in the Republic of the Philippines. 
https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/evaluation/FY2015/pdfs/philippines.pdf 
(accessed: 8.4.19).  
 
National Economic Development Authority (NEDA). 2017. ODA Portfolio Review 
Report. https://www.neda.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Official-Development-
Assistant-ODA-As-of-January-7.pdf (accessed: 20.2.19).  
 
84/86 
National Economic Development Authority (NEDA): “JAPAN REMAINS TOP ODA 
SOURCE AS OF END-SEPT 2018”. Sep. 2018. http://www.neda.gov.ph/japan-
remains-top-oda-source-as-of-end-sept-2018/ (accessed: 20.3.19).  
 
National Economic Development Authority (NEDA):  “JAPAN TO HELP FUND 6 OF 
13 NEW INFRA PROJECTS”. March 2018. http://www.neda.gov.ph/japan-to-help-
fund-6-of-13-new-infra-projects/ (accessed: 20.3.19) 
 
National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) & Japan International  
Development Agency (JICA). 2015. Roadmap for Transport Infrastructure  
Development in Metro Manila and its Surrounding Areas (Region III – Region IV-A).  
Final Report – Summary.  
 
Nieva-Nishimori: “313 JPEPA nurses, caregivers pass language training”. 2018. ABS- 
CBN News. https://news.abs-cbn.com/overseas/05/22/18/313-jpepa-nurses-caregivers- 
pass-language-training (accessed: 6.2.19). 
 
Nikitina Larisa & Furuoka Fumitaka. 2008. Ancient Regime of Japan‟s Foreign Aid 
Policy: Main Characteristics of Japan‟s Aid Administration System Before its Reforms.  
MPRA Paper No. 7046. 
 
Ochiai Naoyuki. 2016. The Mindanao Conflict: Efforts for Building Peace through  
Development. Asia-Pacific Review, 2016 Vol. 23, No. 2, 37-59. 
 
OECD: “Aid at a glance charts”. 2017. http://www.oecd.org/japan/aid-at-a-glance.htm.  
(accessed: 23.11.2018).   
 
OECD Data: “Other official flows (OOF)”. 2018. https://data.oecd.org/drf/other-
official-flows-oof.htm. (accessed: 3.12.18).  
 
Ohno Izumi. 2013. Japan‟s ODA Policy and Reforms since the 1990s and 
Role in the New Era of Development Cooperation. National Graduate Institute for  
Policy Studies (GRIPS). 
  
Orr M. Robert Jr. 1990. The Emergence of Japan‟s Foreign Aid Power. Columbia 
University Press.  
 
Panda Ankit: “International Court Issues Unanimous Award in Philippines v. China  
Case on South China Sea”. 2016. The Diplomat.  
https://thediplomat.com/2016/07/international-court-issues-unanimous-award-in- 
philippines-v-china-case-on-south-china-sea/ (accessed: 14.2.19).  
 
Pante Jr. Filologo, Reyes A. Romero, Asanuma Shinji, Yanagihara Toru, Emig Anne et  
al. 1991. Yen for Development – Japanese Foreign Aid and the Politics of Burden- 
Sharing. Council on Foreign Relations Press.  
 
85/86 
Parameswaran Prashanth: “Japan-Philippines Defense Relations Under Duterte: Full  
Steam Ahead?”  2016. The Diplomat.  
https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/japan-philippines-defense-relations-under-duterte-full- 
steam-ahead/ (accessed: 9.11.18). 
 
Parameswaran Prashanth: “Japan-Philippines Defense Ties in the Spotlight with New  
Vessels”. 2017. The Diplomat.   
https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/japan-philippines-defense-ties-in-the-spotlight-with-
new-vessels/ (accessed: 9.11.18).  
 
Peng Er Lam. 2008. Japan‟s Peace-Building in Mindanao: Partnering Malaysia, the 
Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Japanese Studies, 28:1, 45-57.  
 
Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA). 2017. Foreign Investments Fourth Quarter 2017.  
https://psa.gov.ph/sites/default/files/Fourth%20Quarter%202017%20Foreign%20Invest 
ments%20Report.pdf (accessed: 26.3.19).  
 
Presidential Communications Operations Office. 2017. Statement of President Rodrigo  
Roa Duterte during the Joint Press Event.  
https://pcoo.gov.ph/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/20171030-STATEMENT-OF-
PRESIDENT-RODRIGO-ROA-DUTERTE-DURING-THE-JOINT-PRESS-EVENT-
.pdf (accessed: 29.4.19).  
 
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet: “National Security Strategy December 17, 
2013”. 
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/documents/2013/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/18/NSS. 
pdf (accessed: 14.3.19). 
 
Sato Yoichiro, Asano Masahiko et al. 2008. Norms, Interests and Power in Japanese 
Foreign Policy. Palgrave MacMillan.  
 
Strand R. Jonathan & Tuman P. John. 2012. Foreign Aid and Voting Behavior in an 
International Organization: The Case of Japan and the International Whaling  
Commission. Foreign Policy Analysis (2012) 8, 409–430. 
 
The Diplomat: “20 Dead After Bombing of Cathedral in Southern Philippines”. 2019.  
https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/20-dead-after-bombing-of-cathedral-in-southern- 
philippines/ (accessed: 30.1.19).  
 
Timetric. 2017. DoTC – New Bohol Airport – Central Visayas, Construction Project 
Profile. 
 
Trajano Julius Cesar I. 2013. Japan-Philippine Relations: New Dynamics in Strategic  
Partnership. RSIS Commentaries.  
 
86/86 
Trinidad D. Dennis. 2017. Domestic Factors and Strategic Partnership: Redefining 
Philippines-Japan Relations in the 21
st
 Century. Asian Politics & Policy – Vol. 9, Nro. 
4, pp: 613-635.  
 
United Nations: “What is Human Security”. https://www.un.org/humansecurity/what-is-
human-security/ (accessed: 8.4.19).  
 
United Nations Peacekeeping: “Terminology”. 
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/terminology. (accessed: 2.1.19). 
 
Van der Veen A. Maurits. 2011. Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid (Cambridge Studies in  
International Relations). Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ver Marcelo: “The Bangsamoro Organic Law: Everything you need to know”.  2018. 
CNN Philippines. http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2018/07/24/bangsamoro-organic-law-
primer-everything-you-need-to-know-bbl.html (accessed: 18.2.19). 
 
Warkentin Ben, Söderberg Marie et al. 1996. The Business of Japanese Foreign Aid: 
Five Cases from Asia, Routledge.  
 
Weston A. Stephanie. 2014. The Dilemma of Japan‟s Pacifism. Faculty of Law,  
Fukuoka University. 
 
World Bank. PHILIPPINES: LESSONS LEARNED FROM YOLANDA 
An Assessment of the Post-Yolanda Short and Medium-Term Recovery and  
Rehabilitation Interventions of the Government.  
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/537771507750178892/text/120393-Policy- 
Note-Final-Version.txt (accessed: 8.4.19).  
 
Zambrano Chiara: “EXCLUSIVE: Chinese harvesting giant clams in Scarborough  
Shoal”. 2019. https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/04/15/19/exclusive-chinese-harvesting- 
giant-clams-in-scarborough-shoal (accessed: 24.4.19).   
 
Zappa Marco. 2018. Help the Poor, Help Ourselves - Merging Individual and Collective  
Interests in the Official Discourse on Japanese ODA since 2000. Annali di Ca‘ Foscari.  
Serie orientale, 54, 2018, 407-432.  
 
Zhang Jie et al. 2017. China's Belt and Road Initiatives and its Neighboring  
Diplomacy. World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.  
 
 
 
 
